PPESextonPhil2025

Rawls makes it very clear that efficiency is not justice. In the natural liberty system, if we view the outcome of distributions as efficient and just, we must accept the basis of how the initial distribution is determined. This, he says, is done by presupposing a background of equal liberties so that natural talents and abilities influence how shares are distributed. Rawls takes issue with this, saying that these factors are “so arbitrary from a moral point of view” that they should not determine distribution. His liberal interpretation, especially his difference principle, attempts to correct for this. It is neither just nor efficient that a person from a wealthy background can afford education while someone from a poorer background cannot. Rawls believes in equality of opportunity, meaning those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. This is assuming a distribution of natural assets: those who are at the same level of talent and ability (and have the sam...

As I was reading Rawls, I found his second principle of justice appealing but difficult to really apply practically to American policy. However, after some google searching, I found that many see Obama as a Rawls-lover.  One 2013 The Economist article wrote that “ Enhancing what Rawls calls “background justice”—the fair functioning of social institutions necessary for true equality of opportunity—is the moral impetus behind Mr Obama’s proposal [in the state-of-the-union].”  I wanted to look into Obama’s potentially most famous policy to see if it followed Rawls’s second principle of justice.  The Affordable Care Act was a 2010 law that increased health insurance coverage for the uninsured and implemented reforms to the health insurance market. The ACA could be seen as an attempt to implement Rawls by minimizing disparities. However, it goes without saying that this one act did not fix the healthcare system. Nevertheless, it’s interesting and hopeful that Rawls’s theory ...

      I think Rawls does some pretty brilliant thinking in parts of this essay, but I was left a little disappointed in how he distinguished his theory of justice as fairness from utilitarianism and perfectionism. His distinction between the concept of justice from "the various conceptions of justice" as the shared territory between various conceptions grounds his analysis of morality in a way other philosophers we have read did not (Rawls 5). Rather than making sweeping claims about what people necessarily believe and moving from there, he sets a more reasonable aim of trying to develop a framework that most closely serves as many rational views on justice as possible. This approach makes much more sense to me, as justice so clearly means so many different things to different people, and we even frequently self-contradict our own notions of justice in our actions.      Having laid out this strength of justice as fairness, he then goes on to critique utilit...

My understanding is that Rawls's theory is meant to be an ideal that liberal society should aim to pursue. Essentially, his just society is what liberalism should strive toward. While it may be enticing, I don't think it makes sense to critique it on the basis of its application because, as an ideal theory, its merit comes from the way its concepts have played in shaping policy (which is seems like it has to some extent). In fact, I would go as far as to say that these types of idealized perspectives are necessary in helping people construct a vision of society in their minds that they would even want to pursue. With this being said, I DO find it relevant to raise some questions regarding the role that concepts and conceptions of justice have to play in the formation of his just society.  Rawls writes that "it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice" (5) making clear that there is a difference between the tw...

I want to put Nozick and Rawls in conversation with each other because I think that at a high level they both are specifying the background conditions that must be satisfied for a distribution to be just. For Nozick, he relies on the Lockean proviso (i.e someone’s appropriation of property can be considered just so long as there is enough and as good left for everyone else) which provides the foundation for his subsequent entitlement theory within which justice in acquisition, transfer and the rectification of justice in holdings are principles. For Rawls, the background conditions that must be satisfied for distribution to be just are the two principles that he asserts would be consented to in the original position—which imagines individuals behind a veil of ignorance, where they do not know their social status, talents, or personal biases. The first principle specifies that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties” and the difference prin...

To what extent should legal precedent, founded on increasingly unpalatable institutional values, be upheld for the sake of formal justice? Rawls posits that justice must be grounded in the protection of legitimate expectations, particularly in a system where individuals have good reason to rely on established rules. Formal justice, according to Rawls, is the “impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive principles” (51). This is a powerful argument for stability and predictability in legal systems, where individuals can align their actions with the expectations of the law, knowing that even if they will be treated unjustly (as formal justice does not preclude unjust laws), they will be treated consistently . Individuals will at least “know what is demanded" so that they can "try to protect themselves accordingly; whereas there is even greater injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cas...

I wanted to continue the conversation Zach and I had about Marx, Ideology, and Consciousness in tutorial, and how it connects to Toole's work.  When your entire existence is shaped by ideology, of course, you view the world through its lens. Not just on the level of discrimination, but the level of the words we use to describe something and the frameworks that we use to analyze something. These ways of thinking have been ingrained in us, largely thanks to the ruling class. If ideology structures how we perceive reality, how does anyone ever break free from it in the first place? For Marx, it’s not about someone just waking up one day and deciding to resist ideology—it’s about contradictions in material life creating the conditions for awareness, which prompt revolution. People experience horrible things that don’t align with the ideology being enforced by the ruling class. Yet, many can rationalize complete absurdity, potentially showing that awareness requires the extremes of ineq...

                    I think its hard to say that consciousness-raising can help a non-marginalized person "acquire many (if not all) of the epistemic advantages that oppression affords those who are socially marginalized" (Toole 423). As I understand it, consciousness-raising is analogous to the training an expert would as the mechanism of obtaining their expertise (Toole 418). But while I see how one could learn to understand some of the challenges and unique interest areas of a given marginalized group, one can never claim to fully understand what it is like to live as a member of the group. I'd imagine there's an aspect of continuous living under the specific oppression of society day in and day out that is incommunicable to those who don't have to deal with the same challenges. Consciousness-raising is an undoubtedly important tool for limiting the gap in understanding, but humility about the limits of what one can understa...

Toole employs a vast toolbox in her argument on epistemology . These definitions got me (and I know some of you) pretty tangled up, so I wanted to use this blogpost to dive into her set of definitions and how they are utilized by Toole. Toole's argument is on epistemology, a word that some of y'all might have been familiar with before reading, but in case you arent,  epistemic (adj.), "relating to knowledge or the degree of its validation." Following from this definition are its  derivational morphemes  as well as all the subsequent definitions which this blog post will lay out. On page 410, Toole establishes two  definitions of the epistemological privilege thesis, borne from the ambiguity of its usage in the literature.  1) Inversion Thesis / Epistemic Advantage Thesis: the claim that oppressed social locations confer epistemically superior knowledge as compared to dominant social locations. 2) Standpoint Thesis: the claim that marginalized standpoints confe...

Quick Summary: Toole’s central argument is that social identity “puts one in a position to know” (411) aspects of the world that might remain hidden from those who do not experience marginalization. To explain this, the work introduces two claims within standpoint epistemology. One, the epistemic advantage (inversion) thesis argues that the experience of oppression confers real, substantial benefits. Because marginalized individuals gather “more evidence” from their everyday social experiences of oppression, have greater motivations to understand social marginalization and their own oppression “in virtue of their own vulnerability”, and develop “better cognitive capacities” to notice subtleties that the dominant often miss, they have an inherent advantage in understanding social realities (411). The epistemic privilege (standpoint) thesis goes a step further, arguing that this advantage isn’t merely a by-product of social location; rather, it must be actively achieved. Toole asserts th...

       Here's my summary of epistemic advantage. People   who  have access to greater evidence or greater ability to use that evidence, have greater knowledge in the area to which their evidence and skills apply. It's not irrational to defer to people who have greater knowledge within society (though I don't think Toole outrightly says this). Marginalization can be a source of a greater pool of evidence and more instances to practice using that evidence through the process of consciousness-raising. So it is not irrational to defer to people with a marginalized identity that has gone through consciousness-raising when dealing with questions surrounding that identity. Despite it not being irrational, I think the presence of echo chambers and polarization leads me to believe that people don't empirically act in a way that recognizes epistemic advantage. Instead, we search out opinions that validate our own, leading to polarization . Epistemic advantage, could ...

The title comes from a recurring thought that I have had since the first semester of my freshman year. Much like other elite higher-education institutions in America, CMC has some brilliant students that have immense capacities for critical thinking and problem-solving. And much like other elite higher-education institutions in America, CMC (especially) has a significant portion of their student body go into finance. Whether you like it or not, the finance world is hell bent on maintaining a status quo that is incredibly oppressive and clearly unsustainable. Regrettably, I see the appeal of chasing the bag and am in constant conversation with myself about my career choices BUT, I do wonder what an America who's "best and brightest" went into, say, education would like.  I see the use of consciousness-raising in Professor Toole's paper as a particular form of education that draws people closer to realizing epistemic privilege, this sort of perception of oppressive stru...

In Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege, Toole argues that individuals occupying marginalized standpoints possess an epistemic advantage, meaning their knowledge is “evidentially or cognitively superior” (416) to that of dominant standpoints. She clarifies a common conflation in standpoint epistemology by distinguishing between two key theses: the inversion thesis, which claims that “oppressed social locations confer epistemic advantages,” and the standpoint thesis, which asserts that epistemic advantages stem from standpoints rather than social location itself. Importantly, Toole emphasizes that a standpoint does not arise automatically from occupying a marginalized position. Instead, it is something “struggled for, achieved, by epistemic agents who are critically aware of the conditions under which knowledge is produced and occupied” (413). This process, known as consciousness-raising involves individuals “coming together in groups, identi...

While reading Toole’s discussion of epistemic privilege, I could not help but to think of the potential consequences and applications of the epistemic privilege thesis if it were popularized in society today. I am sure there are endless applications, but two immediately came to mind: one with a positive result for the oppressed (“good news”) and one with a negative result for the oppressed (“bad news”). GOOD NEWS I see potential for the assertion that “marginalized standpoints are epistemically privileged over dominant standpoints” to provide a merit-based argument in support of affirmative action (420). Perhaps the most common response from a member of the public who disapproves of affirmative action in hiring or admission, if asked on the street (I am imagining one of those interviews with an uneducated boomer), is that candidates ought to be judged only on their qualifications for the position independently of inherent identities such as race, gender, socioeconomic class, etc. But w...

  Toole argues that “both [the marginalized and non-marginalized] require a sort of training, the cultivation of a critical outlook on the experiences one has (and the evidence those experiences make available)” (417). Additionally, according to Toole, “consciousness-raising refers to the practice of coming together in groups, identifying commonalities in experience, and developing a critical perspective on those commonalities” (417). Through consciousness-raising one can identify harmful ideologies and recognize patterns of oppression that others may not notice.  However, I’m curious what could cause the initial act of consciousness-raising. Toole writes that “prior to consciousness-raising the whole of the phenomenal framework in and through which the individual receives, classified, channels, and responds to her experiences’ will be shaped by the operative ideological framework” (422). I wonder how anyone can initially escape what Toole describes as ‘bad ideology.’  Wh...

                                                                         SYLLABUS                         Courses: PPE Philosophy Seminar and Philosophy Tutorial Seminar Time: Thursday (and sometimes on Tuesday) 1:15-4:00 Seminar Place: Kravis 168 (when not online or outside) Tutorial Time: Designated Tuesdays, by appointment Professor: Paul Hurley Contact Info: paul.hurley@cmc.edu Office Hours: W 2:00-4:00, F 12:30-2:30 (with occasional rescheduling to accommodate faculty meetings)   INTRODUCTION This is t...