Good News, Bad News

While reading Toole’s discussion of epistemic privilege, I could not help but to think of the potential consequences and applications of the epistemic privilege thesis if it were popularized in society today. I am sure there are endless applications, but two immediately came to mind: one with a positive result for the oppressed (“good news”) and one with a negative result for the oppressed (“bad news”).

GOOD NEWS

I see potential for the assertion that “marginalized standpoints are epistemically privileged over dominant standpoints” to provide a merit-based argument in support of affirmative action (420). Perhaps the most common response from a member of the public who disapproves of affirmative action in hiring or admission, if asked on the street (I am imagining one of those interviews with an uneducated boomer), is that candidates ought to be judged only on their qualifications for the position independently of inherent identities such as race, gender, socioeconomic class, etc. But what if those identities make the candidate more qualified for the position? Affirmative action gives preferential treatment to members of a historically oppressed group on the basis that, because they have been historically oppressed and discriminated against, they are at a disadvantage against other, non-historically oppressed candidates. Hence, arguments in support of affirmative action’s preferential treatment are often centered around it addressing systemic discrimination, rather than valuing merit. But, similar to an expert who undergoes extensive training to make themselves more qualified for a role, Toole shows how, with “consciousness-raising,” “marginalization can be seen to produce many of the same epistemic benefits as expertise” (423). This means that, if members of oppressed groups engage in consciousness-raising, they may gain an epistemic advantage that makes them more qualified to do certain jobs. With this understanding, preferential treatment can be given to applicants from historically oppressed groups—not because they have been historically oppressed, but because their epistemic advantage may make them more qualified than an applicant from a historically dominant group. The limits of this argument, however, lie in (1) how relevant their epistemic advantage is to the qualifications required by the role and (2) that it can be proven they have fulfilled the necessary condition of consciousness-raising. I find it an interesting point to consider, nonetheless.

BAD NEWS

I see potential for the epistemic privilege thesis to be used as rationalization for oppression. If members of oppressed groups can be given the conditions to develop epistemic advantage by being oppressed, then oppressors may rationalize their actions as doing the oppressed a favor by providing them with a condition to achieve this advantage. Additionally, this rationalization could come from oppression’s ability to diversify the perspectives of society. The “double consciousness” of marginalized perspectives forces members of oppressed groups to consider both their own perspective, and that of their oppressor—whereas the oppressor only needs to consider his own perspective (421). If increasing oppression will increase the amount of people who understand two perspectives, then oppression may be rationalized as a way to increase a society’s overall understanding of itself.

Neither of these “predictions” are likely to make it into society, however, because the theory is neither known nor accepted widely enough to be adopted. Today’s recruiters, admissions officers, and oppressors, I would assume, are not aware of this argument on the epistemic benefits of marginalization.