PPESextonPhil2025

After reading that it is a “respectable legal position” for Twitter to “exclude anyone it elects to from its platform” (988), I was curious to learn more about the case cited to justify the claim - Moody v. NetChoice LLC. When reading the facts of the case, I was surprised to read that they took as fact that “users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on [social media] platforms”. This feels wrong to me because I do feel an “obligation” to be on social media platforms, and algorithms push content that I might not want to see. Perhaps this stems from a generational divide, because the social pressure to be on social media is admittedly the biggest. But, in terms of strict obligation, many people have no choice but to be on social media sites that dictate their workplace infrastructure (e.g. LinkedIn, Handshake, FB), their social life (Instagram, FB, X), their access to news, etc. To me, our current society necessitates that people use such platforms to live a ful...

This post forwards a concern I have external to Shiffrin’s argument, but relevant when considering the implications of how she proposes government officials should communicate with the public.  Shiffrin holds government officials (speaking in their capacity as government officials) to a higher standard in their speech than citizens. In one example of this higher standard, she argues that government officials seeking to criticize the Constitution or how citizens exercise rights must either “not speak in their capacity as governmental officials” or, if they do, “make clear what the extant protection is” with a (non-“fine print,” “rubber-stamped”) disclaimer (1004). She recognizes this imbalance in responsibility, reaffirming that “this requirement does burden the speech of government officials with higher standards than lay citizens, but that heightened burden is consistent with the special role of government officials” (1005). Can we not burden government officials to the point wher...

 Hey everyone, I just had the pleasure of reading this New York Times article about an  interview  Trump did with NBC. I highly recommend watching the clip; it's about 3 minutes. But the tldr is this -- Trump responded to the question about whether or not he agreed with Marco Rubio's statement that everyone, regardless of citizenship, deserves due process with "I don't know, I'm not a lawyer". He then follows up by saying that due process would impede his deportation efforts, which was what he was elected to do. The interviewer responded by asking, "But isn't it your duty to uphold the constitution of the United States of America as President?" To which Trump again says, "I don't know, but I have brilliant lawyers that work for me...".   Trump is definitely in an expert position in the government, and yet his answer of "I don't know" if everyone should have due process makes it seem like he is not, in fact, an expert. ...

I would love to bring in Brettschneider’s conception of democracy as collective self-rule, and its implications for how we understand the presidency and broader government accountability.  In Shiffrin’s work, she emphasizes that the president cannot say everything, not because it contradicts a supervisor, but because it defies their commitments to the constitution: “This constraint holds even of those officials, such as the President, who preside at the top of the chain of managerial command. Their speech denying the First Amendment’s protection does not defy a superior official’s directive, but the speech does defy the commitments of the Constitution itself” (Shiffrin 1007). However, if we incorporate Brettschnieders understanding of democracy, I think we could go further and argue that the president is in fact defying his supervisor. Brettschnieder's theory reorients power away from top-down hierarchy and toward the people, arguing that “citizens are not merely subjects of law bu...

​​Sorry if I jump in between ideas a bit too quickly. Just trying to get it all figured out in my head! Shiffrin x Brettschneider: Shiffrin states early on that constitutional content does not track justiciability (993). But if constitutional content does not track justiciability (aka certain constitutional violations like government officials lying / violating the First Amendment are acknowledged to exist but are nevertheless nonjusticiable), I'm still left confused on what the normative OR institutional point of having a Supreme Court is? Isn’t the foundational idea of judicial review that the Court exists precisely to interpret and enforce constitutional limits, particularly against executive or legislative overreach? If constitutional provisions or principles are beyond the Court’s reach and enforcement lies elsewhere, where lies its core role? Shiffrin seems to suggest that the Supreme Court still has a role in clarifying and promoting constitutional ideals even when it can’t ...

From the outset, I would like to say I appreciate the nuance that Shiffrin provides in addressing a problem that (as we discussed in our seminar on Speech Matters ) is not black and white. She demonstrates its clearly not a simple as banning all the actors who spew out speech that isn't congruent with the First Amendment, as that would set a precedent that could render speech that, for example, questions authority, or is simply a mistake, as unlawful. This, of course, would undoubtedly have remedial effects on our society's ability to cultivate effective approaches to epistemic production and, in short, stifle progress.  As regarding most of our society's problems, my interest lies in the rectification process, and the case of free speech is no different! In general, I think Shiffrin's suggestion of setting different standards for speech made by experts and government officials is a great step in the right direction. Experts and government officials clearly have a disti...

Shiffrin observes that while social media companies may justifiably impose temporary suspensions in response to repeated rule violations, “a permanent, irreversible ban, even one imposed by private actors, seems almost inconsistent with a professed deep commitment to free speech values” (1021). This distinction between temporary and permanent bans raises important questions about how private companies should determine when a user deserves reinstatement. Should the duration of suspensions be public and standardized, or assessed individually? Is the passage of time alone ever a meaningful indicator of readiness to return, or should reinstatement require acknowledgment of harm, efforts at repair, or evidence of behavioral change? Right now, I’m inclined to think that acknowledgment of harm and demonstrated behavioral change should be central to any reinstatement process, as they reflect a genuine commitment to growth rather than passive waiting. However, this approach is not without chall...

In her analysis of government speech, Seana Shiffrin reminds us that “government officials and licensed experts have heightened responsibilities, given their roles, of both sincerity and accuracy and often have special access to sources of information, thereby reducing opportunity for external verification and rebuttal” (p. 1025). This asymmetry in access to knowledge, paired with the authority these figures hold, gives their speech unique weight - and unique potential for harm when misused. Shiffrin rightly argues that such speech should be scrutinized under heightened standards because of the distinct way that it shapes public understanding. I am curious as to what constitutional obligations algorithms (and their creators, i.e., the platforms that house them) should be held to. Specifically, the algorithms deployed by private social media platforms that govern what is seen, what is buried, and what circulates. These algorithmic systems, though ostensibly neutral tools, make decision...

On page 1025, Shiffrin writes that “the potential for unmediated mass distribution of government misrepresentation should stimulate a reconsideration of our free speech assumptions about government speech.” However, I question if recent technological and social media changes alter the constitutionality or morality of government speech. While changes in technology and social media may make lies more effective at their aims, I do not think such an outcome-centered approach should be used to evaluate the morality or constitutionality of a lie. If Trump posts an egregious lie on Twitter seen by a million people or places a quote into a newspaper seen by 10 people, both should stimulate a reconsideration of free speech assumptions about government speech.  I had some proposals for implementing Shiffrin’s proposals. In order to regulate experts and politicians, verified accounts could be held to stronger regulations on the accuracy of their statements. Additionally, users could categoriz...

Beyond its academic value, this reading had a unique entertainment value akin to watching someone solve a Sudoku puzzle. Shiffrin tackles a phenomena that is obviously bad––government lies––in the context of the current political climate, where it is somehow an insufficient critique to call the presidential assault on free speech what it is. Instead, Shiffrin recharges previously uncontroversial political norms and sidesteps overeager pragmatism to provide a robust argument for how social media companies should respond.  While I strongly agree with Shiffrin's argument, I'm curious about how Shiffrin would more directly address the administration's abuse of a gray area in communicative norms. In reading Speech Matters , I was concerned that justifications against lying grounded in epistemic necessity may obscure some nuance in how we actually communicate meaning. I think the persistence of that nuance may impede the argument's ability to universally reprimand the nonsens...

According to Putnam’s “Bowling Alone”, our social and civil relationships are deteriorating. If formal checks and balances often fail like you point out, is there any potential for growth by way of rethinking our constitutional structure? Or should we (and how should we focus on strengthening civil society (and preserve processes like forming constitutional constituencies and reclaiming democracy by enlisting recovery presidents)? There seems to be a lot of eerily similar patterns going on throughout the history of the Presidents (restricting the right to dissent, cheat in elections, aggressively authoritarian presidents like Nixon, etc.). Is the fact that Trump was not defeated by Constitutional constituencies a telling sign that we are stuck in the same (if not worsening) patterns of history?

As I was reading the last two chapters, I was struck by the contrast in public engagement with impeachment proceedings between Nixon and Trump. During Nixon’s impeachment hearings related to Watergate, “an estimated 80 percent” of Americans watched. In contrast, during the Ukrainian impeachment hearings, “fewer than 5 percent of Americans watched them on television” (299). While many may have followed the Trump hearings through press reports or social media, the comparison still suggests a stark drop-off in Americans’ attention to and concern for the democratic process. Importantly, Brettschneider also notes that while Nixon’s approval ratings dropped dramatically even among Republicans in response to the hearings, “republicans voted to acquit Trump, whose approval ratings remained steady,” (299). In a way, this indicates that Trump’s supporters didn’t care about Trump’s actions whereas Republicans during Nixon’s time were horrified by his actions. This makes me curious: what has chang...