They see me Rawlsing they hatin

Rawls makes it very clear that efficiency is not justice. In the natural liberty system, if we view the outcome of distributions as efficient and just, we must accept the basis of how the initial distribution is determined. This, he says, is done by presupposing a background of equal liberties so that natural talents and abilities influence how shares are distributed. Rawls takes issue with this, saying that these factors are “so arbitrary from a moral point of view” that they should not determine distribution. His liberal interpretation, especially his difference principle, attempts to correct for this.

It is neither just nor efficient that a person from a wealthy background can afford education while someone from a poorer background cannot. Rawls believes in equality of opportunity, meaning those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. This is assuming a distribution of natural assets: those who are at the same level of talent and ability (and have the same willingness to use them) should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system.


Rawls points out that talent is also arbitrary, somewhat randomly given to certain people at birth and people come to have it by accident or good fortune (not fairness or justness). This leads Rawls to the intuition behind his difference principle, that in a system with fair equality of opportunity, “the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society” (65). The difference principle is needed to overcome the arbitrary nature of natural talents and abilities, guaranteeing that everyone has the basic resources for a fair and just life.


Some questions I have are: How does Rawls’ argument account for personal responsibility? Should individuals bear any consequences for choices that lead to inequality, or does justice require society to always compensate for disadvantages? I think that his system aims to establish a “scheme” that will ensure fairness for the least advantaged members of society, regardless of individual responsibility.


- Eliot

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