Concept? Conception? CONfused.
My understanding is that Rawls's theory is meant to be an ideal that liberal society should aim to pursue. Essentially, his just society is what liberalism should strive toward. While it may be enticing, I don't think it makes sense to critique it on the basis of its application because, as an ideal theory, its merit comes from the way its concepts have played in shaping policy (which is seems like it has to some extent). In fact, I would go as far as to say that these types of idealized perspectives are necessary in helping people construct a vision of society in their minds that they would even want to pursue. With this being said, I DO find it relevant to raise some questions regarding the role that concepts and conceptions of justice have to play in the formation of his just society.
Rawls writes that "it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice" (5) making clear that there is a difference between the two. The concept of justice is the abstract idea of what is fair, while a conception of justice is an actual manifestation of that fairness. While this is coherent definition-wise, I feel as though it breeds a relativism that hurts the potential creation of Rawls's just society. Two conception of justice that are completely different when applied to reality, can both fulfill the concept of justice. He makes the claim that "those who hold different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties..." (5). My question is what if someones conception of justice calls a different kind of fairness to mind as opposed to another conception of justice?
Later, Rawls does introduce the veil of ignorance as a means of universalizing this conception of justice and bringing society to define justice as fairness, but even in that case: What if someone has the perspective that regardless of what social class they would be post-veil they think that the most powerful people in society should dictate the liberties of the less powerful and that, ultimately, that is the best case scenario for all people. What if someone believes that basic rights and duties should correspond with their perceived capacities, not on the general basis that they are a human being? What if someone's "appropriate division of social advantages" (9) is in opposition to another's?
Basically, I am not sure if the relativism that liberalism allows for is compatible with Rawls's theory. He seems to feel that liberalism IS the necessary medium for bringing about his just society. I feel like there needs to be some sort of starting framework that harmonizes the concept and conception of justice. I get the feeling I have his account wrong to some extent so my questions are most definitely clarifying ones.
Also, I am noticing a lot of parallels between his theory of a just society and neo-liberal economic theory which is making me question how effective it would be toward the systemic overhaul that I keep concluding (based on conscious observation of world affairs) is necessary.
Hey Shiraz,
ReplyDeleteI think abortion is one way to square your concerns a little bit. In this case, our concept of justice is that everyone has a right to life, and we agree that the state should punish murderers, that is not an arbitrary distinction, but a just one. However, different people have different views on what constitutes a person with a right to life, and who is a murderer. These are different conceptions of justice. Despite those different conceptions, no one disagrees that the state should punish murders and protect the right to life. If there is conflict between conceptions of justice, not a question of institutions, and their concept of justice themselves. I don't think Rawls gives a good answer on how to deal with differing conceptions but it also doesn't conflict with his argument for Justice as Fairness, as I understood that to be an argument for a concept of justice (I'm only ~70% confident in that claim though).
A possible response to your arguments about "What If's" under the veil of ignorance is that they are irrational given his assumption that people act in their own self-interest. Rawls might need to add that the assumption that people are risk-averse. But after that, if you are choosing between definitely having basic rights (on the basis of being a human being) and possibly having slightly more or possibly having none (on the basis of capability or something else). So a rational, risk-averse agent will always choose to Rawl's two principles. I'm not totally satisfied with that answer, but I think the hypothetical nature of the "veil of ignorance" scenario allows Rawls to assume anything he wants about people to make the point that there are strong similarities between what we view as just, even if we have varying interpretations after that point. Since a hypothetical scenario doesn't rely on empirical evidence, I think it's sufficient for Rawl's argument to respond by saying that those "what if" scenarios just don't happen.
Katie
Thanks for focusing on the concepts/conceptions distinction, since it is crucial to Rawls' project. If Rawls is right that we have, and can agree upon, a shared concept of justice (and he does, crucially, suggest what this shared concept is), and he is right that when we nonetheless attempt to articulate this concept more specifically into a conception of justice, e.g. into specific principles for structuring a just society, our efforts are skewed by our own biases, then it seems plausible that if there is some way to minimize the distorting effects of those biases, clearing the way to arrive at a more concrete conception of justice, we should jump at such an opportunity. He offers such a way, and claims that it does support a particular conception, the two principles. I am not clear, Shiraz, how worries about relativism arise within this approach, so I look forward to you clarifying that in discussion. Katie's is a different kind of challenge, it seems to me. What if we agree on a concept of justice, in particular that principles of justice govern society understood as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, but we disagree about the set of people whose mutual advantage must be taken into account, i.e. are fetuses in that set of persons or not?
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