Trust as an escape from Nihilism

   Blackburn provides a compelling account of trust and human psychology that is both nuanced and workable in relation to the other thinkers we have read. Perhaps it is a strength of his account, but he leaves the basis of morality as an entirely mechanistic process. He develops past the traditional model of the prisoners dilemma, but none of the moves he makes are inaccessible to a machine with limited computational power. While I think his framework is broadly accurate, I'm curious if he misses a fundamental desire intrinsic to every human that can provide a basis for our action. 

    Human cooperation can largely accounted for by efficiency. Because we know that we don't know everything, we may "irrationally" make some decisions such as making the first move to build trust. When the risk of deviating is low, it becomes maximizing to occasionally bet that we are missing something and pursue the option that we haven't tried. Then, once the potential for cooperation is recognized between two parties, we can start to move into the dove preferred societal shift he describes where trust remains "rational." One could even account for an altruistic "last move" in this society with efficiency. If the norm of trust has been established, it is inefficient to try and compute each scenario, and therefore one may act altruistically even when no one would know. We still need compliance mechanisms to prevent a backslide due to the same "what if I'm wrong" mentality that led to us trying trust in the first place. A person may try out selfishness and be successful. Others, seeing their success would be compelled to emulate them leading to the erosion of trust. From my understanding, this is why we see so many institutions move in cycles in our society (and perhaps why we are suddenly trying tariffs again after 100 years despite knowing they are stupid). 

    While I see the above paragraph as more of an extension of Blackburn's argument, I'm mainly curious about speculating how/if this account still misses something special about being human. Humans are generally considered different from animals in that we can conceptualize ourselves in advanced ways while they can't (I hope). As a result, the human project is to find coherent ways to conceptualize yourself in an incoherent world (Macintyre style). Doing so independently can be hard, but a great way to feel confident about your own significance is to have it affirmed by others. Therefore, I wonder if trust could be put fourth as a rational state on the basis that it enables us to escape from nihilism. One can conceptualize themselves as significant, yet their may be uncertainty. If one decides to be trusting, they give themselves more room to distinguish themselves from animals in a way that is importantly recognizable and affirmed by others. Adherence to a collective provides certainty of ones own significance. Upon reflection, I think this line of thought could be conceived as an extension of Blackburn's efficiency framework, but I feel like it adds some degree more explanatory power. 

Best,

Aidan :)