Trump, Visas, and Blackburn on why more than exit costs are important
I did spend a large part of the tutorial arguing that lowering exit costs would be almost enough to increase accountability of firms to the point that they can not act arbitrarily, otherwise they would lose their workers. After reading Anderson's response to Cowen, my thoughts have developed a little bit more. Anderson's response to Cowen's argument surrounding lowering exit costs argues that lowering exit costs doesn't matter if there is nowhere to exit to (141). I think there is an argument to go a step further, that even when there is a place to exit to, quitting and/or being fired arbitrarily is suboptimal for everyone.
Take the current Administration's revoking of students' statuses as Anderson's exile analogy of being fired. I'm choosing to focus on students because they often have low costs of exit, they (often) aren't in the country with refugee or other asylum status, can pivot and get an education somewhere else, and are leaving their friends and lives behind, but can build a new one relatively easily. Despite all of this, many people, including myself, view this as wrong. The lack of due process and what I see as arbitrary or bad reasons for revoking status, visas, or detainment seems wrong. It seems wrong, despite low exit costs, because it is still an act of private government. It is an arbitrary action without any accountability to the people it affects; it is private to international students. Before this administration, while international students still could not vote, they still were protected by rights to due process and freedom of speech, tools which constrained the government's actions against them, and allowed them a voice in holding the government accountable, if indirectly. Now, with no guarantees of due process or protected speech, the federal government is effectively private to international students.
Why is this a problem? I agree with many of Anderson's arguments about why private government is bad, but to take a different angle, I want to bring in some Blackburn. Maybe this is completely off because I haven't had to go through getting a visa for the US, but my impression was that the general air of student visas (at least pre-this administration) was once you get your visa, the expectation is that that it could be revoked once it was no longer sponsored, or if a harmful crime was committed but revoking it otherwise was unexpected. By backing out of what I perceived to be a strong expectation, the federal government is proving itself untrustworthy or hawkish. You could also make the argument that freedom of speech and due process are much more than strong expectations. Once someone (or thing) is proven to be hawkish, it never makes sense to act dove-like like and we are all stuck in a worse-off position because there is no chance of cooperation. Within private government, there is very little chance of getting everyone to a dove-dove situation because there is no accountability or predictability of what the government will do.
There is definitely some disanalogies between international students' status being revoked and being fired, but my main point is supporting Anderson's idea that loss of workers or students is often not enough create accountability, and arbitrary decisions made by the private version of the federal government or by firms are wrong not only because of high exit costs and loss of autonomy, and other less outcome based arguments, but also because there are high costs to everyone, not just those leaving but to everyone through the lack of trust created by arbitrary, unaccountable actions.
Hey Katie! Cool blog post. I love the invocation of Blackburn (he's def in my top 5).
ReplyDeleteI disagree mainly on the point of student visas having low exit costs. I also wanted to further your superb argument on the federal government acting as a private government for international students.
First, I see that deportation has one of the highest exit costs of any possible interaction between employer and employee, or (as per your analogy) student and government. Beyond the basic cost of transportation that is explicit in deportation, implicit costs such as the disrupted investment in education and career planning are massive. International students have selected a U.S. college or university over other international or local options, meaning that they have already incurred substantial sunk costs including tuition, relocation expenses, and personal efforts in social, cultural, and academic adaptation. Deportation abruptly annihilates these investments, as course credits fail to easily transfer between differing international education systems, forcing these students to repeat semesters or years. Further, deportation imposes a massive utility loss for both the deported student and the community from which they were deported. Valuable relationships and social connections are severed, making the suggestion that the student can "build a new one relatively easily" innacurate. Future utility is also hit as many of these students go on to find employment in the U.S. The claim that deported students face low exits costs and can easily pivot to resume their education ignores these costs, and your broader argument can thrive without relying on this assumption.
Second, your argument about the federal government being private to international students is thought provoking. As they have no vote, little to no protections, and no recourse to deportation, these students are certainly beneath an opaque, arbitrary, and unaccountable private government. What is most interesting to me is the interplay between republican, positive, and negative rights within this framework. These students might initially enjoy similar negative and positive freedoms as domestic students--such as freely attending classes and accessing educational opportunities and resources--their republican freedom (freedom from arbitrary, unaccountable power) is not commensurate. Despite this, international students have continued to flock to U.S. institutions because, historically, the tangible benefits of positive freedoms--high-quality education and career opportunities--have oughtweighed a more abstract compromised republican freedom. However, as arbitrary deportations continue and increase under Trump, students will reconsider their educational calculus. I predict that fewer international students will choose U.S. universities because the value of republican freedom, undervalued without infringement, becomes clearest in times of crisis.
Hey guys! Had some thoughts to extend some of your points. Katie, I'm really unconvinced by the analogy between firing and deportation (the structural and legal contexts feel too different, and I agree with Gabe entirely here). That being said, I completely agree with your main point: even when exit is theoretically available, arbitrary and unaccountable decisions still cause deep harm, not just to individuals, but to the trust and legitimacy of the institution as a whole. Gabe, I found your point about republican freedom especially compelling. International students may enjoy certain positive and negative liberties, but without protection from arbitrary power, they’re effectively governed without recourse or representation. That trade-off, which might have once seemed acceptable because of the tangible benefits of a U.S. education, starts to look much riskier in times of political volatility. One thing this made me think about is how universities themselves respond to living under our current administration. Rather than resisting arbitrary state power, we might see them internalizing it. Instead of advocating for their international students, I can easily imagine that they will adapt to unpredictability by preemptively limiting support: offering only short-term housing, discouraging certain forms of activism, or avoiding public defense of students’ rights. In other words, arbitrary federal action doesn’t just harm students directly, it reshapes the behavior of the institutions around them. So for example, a university that knows student visas might be pulled at any moment without warning, or anticipates ICE raids/visa revocations. Rather than advocate for students, it builds policies around minimizing liability, offering no long-term housing contracts, no mental health services for international students, no formal recognition of these students in leadership roles because it’s “too risky.” The federal government isn’t the only private government anymore; the university becomes one too, preemptively insulating itself from accountability under the logic of unpredictability. All of this is justified as "risk management" but I guess it effectively codifies second-class status for itnernational students and expands the reach of arbitrary governance. If you aren't a US citizen, or even a guaranteed full-term member of the institution, what protections do you have that makes the institution accountable to you? I think this is an increasing worry and, as Gabe pointed out, until this uncertainty is rectified, it's definitely a risk that many international students will stop taking.
ReplyDeleteLove the conversation here! Wanted to add about why more than exit costs are important, specifically the importance of entry costs. The topic of entry costs is one that Anderson never names, but begins to circle around in her response to Cowen.
ReplyDeleteLet’s consider what it means to “exit” a government, both in the abstract sense of society and in the concrete comparison to a company. If someone exits a government— choosing to no longer tacitly consent, they are not simply back in the State of Nature. John Locke argued that individuals who withdraw their tacit consent to government effectively return to a state outside civil society. But this is an oversimplification in modern day. As all land belongs to a state, one can not exist stateless on stateless land, they are stateless in a foreign state—powerless. Refugees and asylum seekers have limited power in America, and no real choices.
Then, there is exit as Anderson presents it in relation to the firms: “By forcing governments to compete for subjects, exit rights put pressure on governments to offer their subjects better deals”(66). This does not seem to be true in the reality that Anderson presents. Losing ones job and becoming unemployed is much more than switching to a preferred firm. Unemployment brings devastating consequences far beyond lost income: “Unemployment has major negative effects on happiness and health, far beyond what the lost income otherwise would induce” (114). Worse, firms often exploit this desperation. In dangerous conditions, Amazon reportedly didn’t mitigate risks. They instead stationed ambulances outside: “Amazon didn’t care, because regional unemployment was high, and they had hundreds of applicants to replace the fallen workers” (129). In these examples, not only are barriers to entry incredibly important, but financial security and wealth, as they directly impact how someone would experience exit costs. Being unemployed is incredibly different when someone has food insecurity, they might very well choose, or even compete for a spot in an incredibly abusive and dangerous workplace. This amazon regional example is not a one off either, “Much of the time, the entire economy operates in periods of substantial unemployment or underemployment, affecting workers generally: even if they have a job, the cost of job loss is so high they have to put up with nearly any abuse just to hang on to an income” (139).
In a system where people are expected to discipline firms or governments by leaving (as Anderson says), but are too economically trapped to do so, the very idea of exit loses its value. You can’t walk away from a job when the alternative is hunger. You can’t opt out of a government when every square inch of the earth is claimed by one. The supposed freedom of exit becomes a fiction in a world full of barriers to entry.
Note for Aria: As this is playing out right now with universities opposing the federal government, it is interesting to see both the outcome you expected, and Harvard’s reaction, defiance.
Letter sent to Harvard: https://www.harvard.edu/research-funding/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2025/04/Letter-Sent-to-Harvard-2025-04-11.pdf
Their reply: https://www.harvard.edu/president/news/2025/the-promise-of-american-higher-education/
I want to bring together some thoughts I have relating to entry costs (Mea’s post) and the assertion of how things may change under Trump (Bika’s post).
DeleteLike Mea, I was horrified with the Amazon example that Anderson provided. Amazon did not care for worker’s satisfaction with their job, or their health within it, because “regional unemployment was high, and they had hundreds of applicants to replace the fallen workers” (129). Particularly, in Anderson’s response to Cowen, it is clear that this unemployment cycle allowing for abuses is particularly harmful for workers of lower socioeconomic level, particularly “the very bottom of America’s wage labor system” (137).
As I constantly think about the potential effects of Trump’s tariff policy and American isolationism, one thing that comes to mind is the uptick in demand for labor in blue-collar manufacturing jobs. I could not find the article to cite, but last week I read about an automotive factory in Texas raising the wages it hired workers at because they needed to expand production within the U.S. to avoid tariffs. Generally, companies are responding to tariffs by shifting to manufacturing within the U.S., creating a demand for working-class jobs (while also taking away from other, more skilled jobs).
Anderson’s response to Cowen about entry costs for employment is that “employers don’t have to compete for workers who aren’t scarce: those who are unskilled, inexperienced…” (138-139). My hypothesis is that, if tariffs actually do succeed in moving manufacturing to the U.S., there will no longer be scarcity for unskilled workers to fill manufacturing jobs. Companies will struggle to fill any new job created as the American labor market has, since globalization, adjusted to more skilled work as we import the products of unskilled labor. Now, private governments such as Amazon will have to be more responsive to their workers because market scarcity means that the employees are more free to leave for another job, and the company is less likely to be able to fill their role.
I hate to find reasons to support dumbass tariffs and isolationism, because the adverse effects will absolutely ultimately outweigh the benefits, but it does seem like isolationism could be a way to increase scarcity such that private governments do not have the same power it does in labor-abundant markets—like Amazon faces.
**Katie's post, not Bika's
Delete
ReplyDeleteVery interesting application of Anderson and Blackburn!
In the case of Harvard, it's interesting to think of the game theory between Harvard and Trump and its resulting impacts on international students. While Trump has long pushed xenophobia, his exact policies he enacts are often unpredictable. For example, initially the current administration stated that they were revoking students involved in pro-palestine campus protests, citing a 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act which allows the Secretary of State to deport non-citizens who harm US foreign policy. However, the administration then expanded the scope of whom they targeted-now seeking international students who have committed legal infractions. But, the government is not expressly giving a reason for revoking visas, making some students unsure of what caused such action. Trump's unpredictability of which schools he will target, what infractions justify deportation, etc make it difficult for universities and international students to strategize. This unpredictability would encourage hawkish behavior all around, but it’s interesting to consider what it says about universities that choose hawkish or dove-ish behavior to Trump. Harvard is largely defying Trump, while Columbia largely meet Trump’s demand. According to Blackburn, both decisions are rational and simply display the utility each school gets from their response to Trump’s demand.
Unlike international students, it’s interesting to consider if universities themselves are under private government. I would assume not given the voting privileges of those leading the institutions and their relatively powerful voice in American society. However, I think it’s rather apparent that Trump wishes them to be under private government. In response of Harvard’s defiance, Trump is threatening to remove Harvard’s tax-exempt status as well as remove research funding. This money, long-taken as a given for Harvard and other universities, displays Trump’s attempt to limit the instrumental freedoms the universities have. These instrumental freedoms enable the univeristies’ voice and substantive freedom.