SENsible justice
First, I wanted to say I was REALLY compelled by Sen’s capability approach to development. I think his discussion of freedom in the sense of capabilities was really interesting, especially how he contrasted traditional economic approaches to development measured in terms of wealth/income such as GDP. I also wanted to highlight the idea that according to Sen, the same theory of development (development as freedom) should apply to both poor and wealthy countries because in every context, development as he sees it is to expand people’s real capabilities. I think that in doing so, Sen’s approach challenges the tendency to treat development as merely economic growth in poorer nations, and instead reframes it as a global project of expanding real human capabilities.
Chapter 3 was especially interesting to me because it brought together some of the perspectives we have been talking about throughout the semester including liberalism (and specifically references Nozick), utilitarianism, and Rawls’ conception of justice. I also appreciated how he broke each of these theories down and analyzed the merits and demerits of each. In addition to the analysis he explicitly provided, I also wanted to comment on some distinctions I see between his account and Shelby’s (and Rawls).
Shelby begins from the standpoint of ideal theory (and specifically Rawls’ two principles). For them, justice involves articulating a vision of a perfectly just society and then assessing policies or institutions according to whether they help us achieve that ideal. Rawls’ “original position” and “veil of ignorance” are designed to produce fair principles that govern society’s basic structure. Shelby builds on Rawls to address issues such as racial injustice, maintaining that an ideal provides the necessary normative guidance for real-world action. To put it simply, as I see it, Shelby believes there is an ideal which provides the goal that we should be striving towards. In contrast, Sen does not ask whether a given policy brings us closer to an ideal society, but rather whether it meaningfully improves people’s actual lives. His capabilities approach is rooted in comparative justice, focusing on whether a given reform enhances freedoms and reduces deprivation. In this sense then, as I read it, Sen looks at something as ‘better than’ the current/previous situation if it increases capabilities rather than striving to one ideal.
Another tension between Shelby and Sen relates to what justice should secure. Rawls emphasizes the fair distribution of primary goods—resources such as income, liberties, and opportunities—which individuals can use to pursue their conception of the good life. Sen, however, makes the claim that income or formal rights do not necessarily translate to equal freedom if individuals are unable to convert those goods into real opportunities. To help illustrate this point—particularly regarding environmental diversity—Sen explains that factors like climate can significantly affect what individuals are able to achieve with a given income. For example, he notes that “the heating and clothing requirements of the poor in colder climates cause problems that may not be shared by equally poor people in warmer climates” (70). In other words, people living in colder regions may need to spend more just to meet basic needs, reducing what they can actually do with their income even if it’s the exact same as those in warmer climates. This example fits into his broader claim that personal heterogeneities, social conditions, differences in relational perspectives, and distributions in the family all are a source of variation between real incomes and the advantages we get out of them. Sen's capabilities approach therefore centers on what people are actually able to do and be.
The last aspect I wanted to touch on is how they address tradeoffs. Sen, as a consequentialist, is willing to entertain policies that increase aggregate freedoms even if some individuals' capabilities are not improved or are even diminished—he’s looking at a net positive expansion of capabilities. Rawls and Shelby reject this consequentialist reasoning. For them, justice requires treating individuals as ends in themselves. No person’s rights or opportunities should be compromised for the sake of increasing aggregate welfare. Rawls’s difference principle—which allows inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged—reflects this commitment.
Hi, Sophia! I really liked Sen and Rawls, so I was also drawn to compare them.
ReplyDeleteSen’s overarching issue with Rawls is his “parametric variation of resources and primary goods vis-à-vis the opportunity to achieve high quality of living” (78). Sen takes issue with Rawls’s primary goods basket because of “personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives, and distribution within the family” (73) impact on one’s real ability to suceed. Essentially, Sen argues that what is seen as a necessity in each society varies. As an example, what is needed to “appear in public without shame” varies (73). Sen also cites that people in the US require a telephone, television, and/or automobile “to take part in the life of the community (74). However, I understood Rawls’s Fair Equality of Opportunity to similarly allow for such luxuries.
Let me elaborate. Sen focuses on the capabilities approach which I took as being rather similar to Rawls’s fair equality approach. As you mentioned Sen talks about how formal rights do not perfectly translate into equal freedom. However, Rawls makes a rather similar distinction between formal and fair rights. Rawls places focus on the fact that your social background should not determine your chances at success. I think Rawls would consider “personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives, and distribution within the family” as part of your social background. Rawls, like Sen, does not think that everyone in the globe has to have the same resources, rather what it takes to succeed.
While Sen might disagree with Rawls’s difference principle, I found their arguments about formal versus fair rights rather similar!
That's a really thoughtful take, and I actually think you're raising an important point about the proximity between Rawls and Sen that often gets overlooked when we focus only on their disagreements.
ReplyDeleteI agree that both thinkers are concerned with moving beyond merely formal equality—on paper rights—to something more substantive or real. Rawls’s idea of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) does acknowledge that mere legal access to positions isn’t enough; he emphasizes that individuals should have a fair chance to attain offices and positions regardless of their social starting point. This certainly overlaps with Sen’s worry that capabilities can be deeply constrained by one’s background, body, or social context.
However, I think where the distinction really sharpens is what counts as the relevant metric for justice. Rawls still relies on a fairly fixed list of primary goods, arguing that justice involves distributing these in a way that benefits the least advantaged. Sen’s key criticism is that this approach assumes everyone has a similar ability to convert those goods into valuable functionings. That’s where his capabilities approach departs: it’s less about distributing resources and more about ensuring people have real freedoms to be and do what they have reason to value.
So when you say Rawls would take “personal heterogeneities” into account, that’s definitely plausible—Rawls was concerned with background injustice—but I think Sen would argue that Rawls doesn’t fully follow through on that concern. By focusing on goods rather than capabilities, Rawls potentially misses how the same basket of goods means very different things for different people (e.g., a wheelchair user vs. a non-disabled person).
In short, I think you’re right to notice that both are committed to deeper forms of equality—but Sen might say Rawls stops just short of fully realizing that vision because he sticks with a resource-based model rather than a freedom-based one.