Is the system reasonably just enough for truth-telling?
I want to use this blog post to focus on one specific line in the reading:
“One may not perjure oneself in court (at least if the system is reasonably just)” (28).
That second half, “at least if the system is reasonably just” jumped out at me as very important. It immediately raises a big question: if the system is not just, is lying then okay? Or even required? This is specifically important in America, where the legal system is continually established to be unjust. If we apply Shiffrin’s ideas to how we live a moral life, is perjury okay in America?
In the example of Murderer-at-the-door, truth-telling seems wrong based on the outcome. But Shiffrin resists the simple utilitarian conclusions. Lying, she argues, isn’t just a pragmatic problem of a single situation; it’s a deep moral one about humans together.
According to Shiffrin, the wrong of lying has three parts:
It wrongs the listener, by presenting unreliable testimonial warrants (23).
It wrongs the liar, by removing their capacity for moral communication (24).
It wrongs humanity, by undermining the possibility of shared, rational discourse (24).
So even if the listener is corrupt, for example, a biased judge or prosecutor, the act of lying still ruptures something essential for Shiffrin. What do we do when someone on the stand has reason to lie, but should not under the premise of context that Shiffrin gives? Even in broken systems, lying risks destroying the chance of morality that could lead us out, what she calls a "channel or compass" (25). It erodes the very conditions under which justice could ever emerge from. Specifically, what Shiffrin calls the “exit”: “We must preserve an exit through which we could negotiate an end to conflict and move toward reconciliation using rational discourse…” (25).
However, I feel like things are more complicated than that. Because, if the system doesn't offer a real possibility for reconciliation or justice, if it's not “reasonably just”, then the speaker is left in a kind of epistemic no-man’s land. The speaker has both the duty to preserve future rational moral dialogue and the duty to resist oppression.
Interestingly, Shiffrin accepts Kant’s view that officials have a special status: “Utterances to officials in their official capacity are, generally, declarations” (28). It makes me wonder: isn’t the coercion of the courtroom itself a kind of injustice? Being compelled to testify under oath, perhaps under threat (of life in jail, etc.), creates a different suspension. Is the stand a space of truth, or of power? And if it’s power, maybe the moral obligations change…?
Note: Do things change if someone has a charge for life in prison, or death row? Perhaps their only chance to repair is in the outside world after perjuring themselves, which is not possible if they are stuck in jail?
Further Note: Is life in prison immoral according to Shiffrin because there is no exit?
Hi, Mea! I was also wondering about how reasonably just interacts with Shiffrin’s argument, but I was curious about its relationship to declarations.
ReplyDeleteI heavily disagree with Kant’s argument about comments made to official are declarations and thus are morally obligated not be lies, or as Shiffrin describes, “Kant’s position is best understood as something like the view that utterances to officials in their official capacity are, generally, declarations” (28).
While in many contexts, I can contend that most comments to officials are declarations, I think it heavily depends on the particular justice of the official’s mission. What if the official is the murderer-at-the-door. Imagine Nazi Germany and an official knocks on your door requesting the whereabouts of your Jewish neighbors. Surely now you enter in a justified suspended context. Shiffrin also seems suspicious about Kant's statement as she writes "claim about officials, even if true." I wish she would have taken a specific stance on the issue, even if it means disagreeing about Kant.
I think this connects to a larger contention I have with the reading which is how sure must you be about one’s mission to enter into a justified suspended context. For example, in the typical murderer-at-the-door scenario, how sure must you be that you are talking to a murderer in order to be able to enter a justified suspended context. For example, if I am only 3% confident that I am speaking to murderer, can I lie? Must I be 51% confident? While this may seem nit-picky, I think it is necessary in order to actually applicable to real life. When are we ever 100% sure of everything, especially other’s planned actions??
Hey Mea and Bika,
DeleteI have some thoughts to add onto this. Similar to the scenario Bika brings up of the Nazi officer, I was thinking about undercover police, and lies that police tell to suspects during questioning in order to get information or a confession. This is an example of how clearly our current officers' statements cannot be assumed to be declarations and therefore the truth. In some ways, this is a justified suspended context if you are aware that police can and will lie to you during questioning, and in theory, you are not under any duress as you have the right to remain silent. However, many people don't know or forget that police can lie during the stress of being questioned. So, should police also have to inform people of the fact that police are acting in what they view to be a justified suspended context when questioning you as a part of your Miranda rights? But being in a justified suspended context means that uttering a falsehood is not a lie, so you can tell the cops a falsehood, which seems like a big flaw in our justice system. Shiffrin and Mea touched on having a clear trustworthy path to reconnect with the community, but if police can manufacture an artificial path ,by raising a metaphorical white flag, of, for example, saying they will make a plea deal, that defeats the whole purpose of the truth that Shiffrin outlines.
So I think that the ability of police to lie to suspects during questioning is an example of our system being de jure (I have no clue if I used that right) insufficiently just, even without a biased judge or police officer. I also agree with Bika's point that being able to determine when you are in, or can say you are in, a justified suspended context is important and currently unclear.
Also last thoughts--In the same way that there are higher obligations to the truth when speaking to officials I think the officials have a higher obligation to speak the truth (perhaps even more so than the individual). Suppose there is someone about to bomb a bank, the individuals simply at the bank do not need to speak truthfully and, I would argue, can volunteer lies to the bomber. However, an FBI agent communicating to the bomber, I would argue can fake empathy for the bomber but should follow through on promises made to the bomber. However, I do not think these promises should be followed through on the basis of morality but because of consequentialism. If the FBI routinely made promises they did not follow through on, the FBI would be diminished in its ability to make deals.
ReplyDeleteViolet's Original Post: Does Coercion Pay?
ReplyDeleteDespite Shiffrin’s rebuttals, I am not convinced that her argument sufficiently accounts for the fear of letting coercion “pay.”
Her first defense is that because scripted promises are not morally binding, there is no rational reason to expect a payoff from coercion (because there is no guarantee of someone volunteering a promise) (72). She concedes that this may be unsatisfying because it seems that such a moral obligation would increase the possible benefit of coercion by the “appearance of a reward,” but that it would be difficult to really parce out the conflicting forces which affect the appeal of coercion. Even still, she holds that such concerns are somewhat off topic because they have to do with “whether and when to initiate promises under duress,” which is by no means required or stipulated by her argument (72).
However, it seems morally relevant that voluntary promises may often be the only way to avoid subjection to a coercer’s arbitrary will. Requiring a moral obligation to uphold promises volunteered under duress seems to presuppose any individual’s “right” (though immoral) to exact action from another (moral individual) through coercion. If, while being mugged you can either submit and lose your wallet or negotiate or offer a promise and be morally obligated to lose whatever value you promised, then it seems that morality does not allow to avoid losses in a world where people choose to mug others. Something feels off there. If there was a way to volunteer a promise but avoid paying it (and this is the only way to avoid infringement from an alien will), shouldn’t there be room for this in morality? Or would the loss of an “exit” avenue of truthful communication and possibility for communal moral advancement really outweigh? (This argument also seems importantly consequential, but that’s another blog post). Could there be some other avenue of communicative “exit” from the suspended context that could allow for volunteering lies?
Although I fully subscribe to the importance of creating avenues for moral advancement through the connections she describes, and also believe these would often require a moral uprightness and in some ways moral “sacrifice” by moral actors, it seems that there ought to be a way to avoid giving people such strong “rights” (kinda) to the benefits of coercion.