I Love Internal Goods
I really liked MacIntyre when we first read him. I really really like MacIntyre after reading Blackburn.
Blackburn makes a key distinction between empirical and theoretical situations to better understand the priorities/concerns of an agent making a utility-maximizing decision. Empirical situations look at the outcomes of what will empirically result from a given decision. I may choose option A over B, because I will earn $100 in option A and I will be imprisoned for 5 years in option B. As someone who values money over imprisonment, Option A has higher utility to me based on the empirical results. Theoretical situations factor in priorities/concerns that are not tied to the empirical results of a decision to more fully explain the decision-making process. I may choose option B over A because I enjoy the activity of option B, or I know the $100 reward for option A was stolen from a poor family.
I find it helpful—and relevant—to characterize empirical situations as considering MacIntyre’s external goods and theoretical situations as considering MacIntyre’s internal goods. I may choose to do something because the external goods (money, fame, power) I receive will maximize my utility. I may choose to do something because the internal goods (development of my practice, achievement, pursuit of goals) I receive will maximize my utility. An interesting addition Blackburn provides to MacIntyre’s concept of internal and external goods is that it is difficult for a utilitarian to include internal goods in the judgement of a decision because they are not visible in the empirical situation. Blackburn writes, “If we start with raw behaviour, as registered by camera or a choreographer, we do not know which features of the situation are part of the agent’s decision-making representation of it” (170). It is easier for society to prioritize external goods in utilitarian calculations because they can actually be observed, while internal goods cannot. Since Blackburn argues that “true preferences are those that are revealed by decisions,” it is difficult (maybe impossible?) to include internal goods in the ranking of preferences because they are not revealed in the result of a decision (163).
This invisibility of internal goods often leads people to believe that someone who considers internal goods in making a decision is irrational. Blackburn’s example of Maurice with intransitive preferences shows this: though he prefers Rome to the Alps and Home to Rome, he does not prefer Home to the Alps because it is cowardly to avoid the challenge of hiking in the Alps opposed to lounging in the home (168-169). Notice that Maurice is not considering what empirically occurs as a result of these decisions (external goods), but developing courage and facing a challenge that can be realized through the practice of hiking (internal goods). Without understanding his prioritization of internal goods, it seems irrational that Maurice would choose with intransitivity. This same line of reasoning could be used to explain why we often find it irrational for someone to drop out of college to pursue a career in acting, or music, for example.
Additionally, Blackburn’s Centipede game furthers the importance of internal goods in the development of practices—ultimately leading to a greater utility for all involved in the practice. The farmer who helps another farmer harvest his crop with the promise of the favor being returned relies on co-operation and ethics to motivate his action. Here, “the farmers need to be people with some reason for expecting each other to co-operate. They need to have and hope for a little bit of ethics” (175). It is the internal good of contributing to the practice of farming that factors into the decision to help with the harvest, which ultimately increases the external goods achieved by both farmers. This decision may not have been achieved looking only at external goods and empirical results because one result is that the favor is not returned, and the farmer wasted his time helping, decreasing his overall utility.
These internal goods are really awesome.
Thanks for your post Zach! I really like the way that you brought in the concept of internal and external goods into Blackburn's discussions on rational choice. In fact, I think your reference of them is indicative of the strength and importance of Macintyre's theory. That being said, I think your "analogy" could be strengthened a little bit more in that it would seem that Blackburn's theoretical situations can still have individuals making choices in the pursuit of external goods. I think the power of the theoretical situation is that it can account for those behaviors that would otherwise be deemed as irrational by people who adhere to view of utility that requires empirical measurements.
ReplyDeleteWhat I find more interesting about you invoking MacIntyre is thinking about the relationship between his critique of modernity and individual preferences. I imagine that the decay of virtue has significantly influenced the way we view our preferences. The empirical game, which is the dominant approach to decision-making in, say, American business, has no way of accounting for actions that are tempered by virtues (although it may inadvertently). In fact, (and Blackburn alludes to this) those actions which are virtuous would be seen as irrational. Nonetheless, I do think there is an argument to be made that consistent actions tempered by virtues eventually do have an impact that could theoretically be empirically significant---especially at a collective level. On the other hand, the theoretical game has a more expansive reach that could theoretically perform a utility calculation involving virtue. I am someone who definitely has an eversion to the outcome-based view, but I do wonder how some of its shortcomings could be rectified by a widening-of-the-scope similar to what is done with the theoretical game. For example, what if the outcome was internal goods? Those can only be acquired through virtuous engagement with a practice, so the variable of "process" is dealt with. It seems like the theoretical game is doing a similar maneuver. I hope this makes sense.
Hey Shiraz and Aria! Would love to engage with your discussions. I’m still a bit confused by the apparent dichotomy in external goods vs. internal goods and the empirical vs. theoretical game.
DeleteTo me, Blackburn very explicitly points out that within the theoretical game, internal goods (and by extension, virtue since we cannot achieve IGs without it) are both a standalone factor to be considered and a kind of framing tool to understand external goods (notable examples from p. 168). There’s where I would disagree with some implied sentiments in this thread, because I don’t think theoretical situations are characterized purely by internal goods but rather a synthesis between the two. In fact, in all of the examples I can think of from Blackburn, some kind of external good acts as a basis for an understanding of internal goods that could be at play (ex. Blackmail Example, Centipede Game, Toxin Puzzle, etc.). Thus, in reference to Shiraz’s idea of “widening-of-the-scope”, I see the theoretical game as exactly that: a “widening-of-the-scope” outside of the empirical game.
Bit confused on that part since I thought the point of discussing the theoretical game was in its recognition of “‘outcomes’ [and their corresponding actions] as objects of concern” (169) aka what Shiraz refers to as “actions tempered by virtues”. Is the argument here that virtue and the development of internal goods will translate to tangible change within the empirical game? If the the point of the empirical game is that it can only be described in empirical terms, I struggle in understanding how internal goods or virtue could be done so without being considered something distinct.
I have a similar response to Aria’s comment on this topic: “Blackburn’s empirical game focuses on the tangible outcomes produced by decisions, but this doesn’t necessarily exclude actions rooted in internal goods from having a significant impact…when someone helps others out of a sense of virtue, they may not maximize immediate external rewards (like money or power), but they foster cooperation and mutual trust. This creates a cooperative environment that benefits everyone in the long run. Specifically, they create an environment in which the excersize of capabilities is more possible, thereby contributing to greater development (empirically measured) and freedom (theoretically measured, because this involves the obtaining of internal goods)”. While I don’t disagree with you that internal goods have a significant impact, my response to this would be that once something like cooperation and mutual trust is involved, the game ceases to be the empirical game. Again, the empirical game means that things can only be described in empirical terms. Thus, if someone cooperates with me out of a sense of virtue (already considering an internal good) and I reciprocate in the next exchange I have with someone, I have begun to consider things that cannot be described in empirical terms (sense of duty, reciprocity, fairness, etc.). By definition, the empirical game confines itself to being describable by empirical metrics. In essence, the framework simply shifts and the dynamics of actions / outcomes change too. Is the “empirical game” not just the “theoretical game” in this scenario?
Hey Zach! Love how you brought in this idea of internal and external goods to Blackburn's account of empirical and theoretical situations with respect to utility maximization. I do appreciate Shiraz's clarification (and I agree) that Blackburn doesn't refute the idea that theoretical situations can "still have individuals making choices in pursuit of internal goods”. As I read it, these theoretical situations are introduced by Blackburn because they introduce the notion that other factors (aside from external goods which fit into the empirical account) affect the choices people make and what/how people gain utility.
ReplyDeleteOn a semi-unrelated note, I want to briefly refer to our discussion IRL earlier about Blackburn’s conception of promises which he illustrates through the toxin puzzle. Here’s how it goes: in the toxin puzzle, you’re told you’ll get a million dollars now if you can intend to drink a toxin next Wednesday. But the toxin won’t kill you or harm you—it’s just unpleasant. The catch is, you only get the money if you truly intend to drink it, even if you don’t actually go through with it. But here’s the twist: if you’re a rational choice theorist, you know that once you’ve got the money, you have no good reason to actually drink the toxin. So, knowing that, you can’t genuinely intend to do it.
What Blackburn shows is that this is exactly the same structure involved in making a promise. When I make a promise, I commit to doing something in the future even if, by the time I have to do it, the reasons in favor of doing it have changed. That’s what makes it a promise. So, if a rational choice theorist can’t form a real intention in the toxin puzzle, they also can’t actually make a promise. The best they can say is, “I’ll do it if it’s still in my interest.” But that’s not a promise—that’s a conditional plan. Rational choice theory, as it’s typically framed, seems to make the very idea of a genuine promise incoherent.
But as I see it, promising is one of the most empowering things we can do. It’s how we bind our future selves, how we build trust, how we form relationships and communities—all of which provide access to certain internal goods (i.e satisfaction of having integrity, fulfillment of being a good friend etc.) So in this sense then, I think Blackburn’s refutation against the utilitarian who works strictly in terms of empirical circumstances (and primarily external goods) is pretty compelling especially when we consider how integral promises, and more broadly commitments are, in how we live our lives and our interactions with others.
Hey Sophia, would love to engage (and be a bit of a devil’s advocate :) ) with your discussion of promises! Like you I found the Toxin Puzzle super fun to think about, and I absolutely agree that the ability to make a promise excludes rational choice theorists. I’d like to add some nuance into the discussion by framing it in the context of Blackburn and Hume’s discussion on the distinction between an agreement / convention vs. a promise on p. 175 and 176 and discuss benefits outside of what promises can provide (even though I agree with your position on their importance! I just think that importance may moreso come from other sources).
DeleteBlackburn first asserts that if people are to “succeed” in the Blackmail and Centipede examples, they need “some reason for expecting each other to co-operate”... and alludes to Hume’s discussion. Hume writes that “suitable resolution and behavior” is produced by a “common sense of interest [being] mutually expressed. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise”. The distinction made here is that within a convention or an agreement “the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition that something is to be performed on the other part” while a promise is UNILATERAL and thus has no such reference to the actions of the other nor are they performed upon any supposition that something is to be performed by the other. Basically, agreements / conventions are mutual and conditional while promises are neither. This allows for the “sense of interest [to become] common to all our fellows, and gives us confidence”.
This shared commitment can serve as a powerful force for social coordination, often leading to more sustainable outcomes than those rooted solely in promises. For ex., social norms like fairness and reciprocity derive their strength from widespread acceptance rather than isolated promises between individuals. Additionally, conventions and agreements feel a lot more flexible and adaptable than the fixed and idle nature of a promise. It’s actually because they are conditional that they can shapeshift to best evolve alongside communities. In essence, while promises certainly play a vital role in representing individual accountability and trustworthiness, I find that conventions and agreements more fundamentally root our cooperative interactions (and provide us internal goods!!).
Just like the authors argue, reciprocal altruism is the origin of cooperation. “And once cooperation is practiced, it can be extended” (193-194). Would absolutely love to hear your thoughts on how these frameworks might integrate to form a more comprehensive understanding of cooperation!
Hey Zach and Shiraz! This is a super interesting discussion, and I agree with Shiraz that the theoretical approach is much more expansive than the empirical one. It’s powerful because it allows us to 'rationally' pursue internal goods, which (as Blackburn notes) is much harder to do as a strict utilitarian.
ReplyDeleteThat said, I wonder if the empirical game can, in any way, be reconciled with what may seem like “irrational” virtuous action. I think Sen’s capabilities approach could offer an argument that “consistent actions tempered by virtues eventually do have an impact that could theoretically be empirically significant—especially at a collective level,” as Shiraz writes. While it’s true that internal goods may initially be invisible within the empirical framework (and, as Blackburn notes, viewed as irrational or subject to logical issues like intransitivity when making decisions), their long-term influence on individual autonomy and collective outcomes is undeniable.
Blackburn’s empirical game focuses on the tangible outcomes produced by decisions, but this doesn’t necessarily exclude actions rooted in internal goods from having a significant impact. While internal goods may not always be immediately observable, they shape the context and long-term outcomes in ways that can be empirically measured. For example, when someone helps others out of a sense of virtue, they may not maximize immediate external rewards (like money or power), but they foster cooperation and mutual trust. This creates a cooperative environment that benefits everyone in the long run. Specifically, they create an environment in which the excersize of capabilities is more possible, thereby contributing to greater development (empirically measured) and freedom (theoretically measured, because this involves the obtaining of internal goods).
So, even though actions that prioritize internal goods may initially seem “irrational,” they lay the groundwork for larger societal benefits. This is where Sen’s capabilities approach is key. It emphasizes that individual freedom, autonomy, and the ability to pursue meaningful lives are not just abstract ideals but are shaped by both external circumstances and internalized values. To put it simply, even a purely utilitarian framework requires a conducive environment for capabilities to materialize, and that environment is entirely shaped by our values, which we express through the democratic process. In this way, the 'irrational' pursuit of internal goods can actually help generate rational and desirable empirical outcomes, because over time, these virtuous actions shift norms and behaviors within a community, leading to collective benefits. This shift in values and behavior could be considered part of the empirical game itself, making the pursuit of internal goods anything but irrational.
this is more of a devil's advocate-y post, because I do agree with Shiraz and am not a fan of the empirical game (nor utilitarianism). But, I just wanted to explore if there was any way to reconcile the empirical game with virtuous action, especially since Sen's capabilities approach is very much not utilitarian, but he does recognize the merits of utilitarianism.
Hey Everyone! I wish I got to this sooner, ugh! Y'all have had some amazing discussions. I wanted to jump in on the discussion of Maurice that was started by Mr. Roerden. In reading the Blackburn, I thought it was crazy that they talked about a Maurice whose seemingly irrational and intransitive preferences rely on prioritization of internal goods--such as courage and self-respect--over external outcomes. I thought to myself, this HAS to be an illusion to Saint Maurice (who else?), who did go to the alps and who also made a seemingly irrational decision based on the priroitization of internal goods--faith, in this case. I will be going to the library tomorrow to look if the cited John Broome's "Weighing Goods," directly references Saint Maurice. This comment will be dedicated to Saint Maurice, who I learned about in Professor Sinha's Comp Gov and how his story builds on what Blackburn and Roerden say about internal goods.
DeleteSaint Maurice was the military leader of a Roman Legion of Egyptians from Thebes called the Theban Legion. Like the rest of the Theban Legion, Saint Maurice was an outward Christian in a time (late 200s ad) when Christianity was a threat to the still polytheistic Rome. He and his legion were dispatched to the Alps to defeat a peasant revolt. When he received orders to slaughter Christians, Saint Maurice refused, saying that allegience to God superceded allegience to Rome, and that it was unholy for Christians to kill other Christians. For his disobedience, the Emperor ordered the Theban Legion executed. Saint Maurice and the Theban Legion became martyrs for later Christendom, and Saint Maurice himself was the Patron Saint of the Holy Roman Empire.
Here, we see a clear demonstration of what appears to be an empirically irrational decision. Why disobey your commander when you know that the punishment for disobedience is the death--the greatest external punishment? The answer, obvious to those that dubbed him Saint, was his rational allegience to the internal goods of faith, integrity, and courage.
This brings me to my discussion of the interaction between internal goods and external goods. What classifies an internal or external good, really? In our contemporary society, heavily influenced by empirical science and clear facts, these categories are straightforward: faith is internal, life is external. Yet, for Saint Maurice, was faith an internal good, or was he convinced that by refusing an unjust command he would secure eternal salvation—an external good within his worldview? The clear divide between religious conviction and material reality that we presuppose today was, I would argue, incredibly blurry for Saint Maurice and his Theban Legion.
Given this, would his decision even classify as prioritizing internal goods over external goods? I'm not sure, but I like thinking about it.