Varden + Shelby
Varden advocates for a spectrum reading of Kant, rather than a binary. Varden thinks that liberal republic states should be evaluated on a spectrum between the state of nature and civil society. I would like to connect Varden and Shelby’s arguments and argue that where a state falls on this spectrum is directly proportional to what level of obedience is morally obligated to the government.
Tommie Shelby writes that “the victims of social injustice, having been denied their fair share of the benefits of social cooperation, have a reduced obligation to obey the law” (235). Shelby bases this on the principle of reciprocity in which in a society which does not uphold justice the oppressed in said society are not morally required to obey societal sutures.
Similarly, I think Varden would argue that we are not morally required to be unconditionally loyal to the government. Varden writes that governmental institutions have “condoned, facilitated, and even participated” in systemic oppression (16), thus failing to meet the principle of reciprocity Shelby describes. She further writes that the oppressed are “obvious targets for destructive political forces” (17). On the matter of the oppressed directly, Varden writes that “there are no good ways out is an additional reason why living subjected to oppression is essentially exhausting” (18). I imagine this exhaustion would justify different levels of obedience between the oppressed and non-oppressed.
I wonder for both philosophers if they believe the level of obedience morally required is equal in Nazi Germany between jewish and non-jewish residents. Shelby largely focuses on the level of obedience required of the oppressed. However, Shelby does write about the duty of justice for the non-oppressed and writes that it is “practically impossible to reduce the suffering of the oppressed without inadvertently helping to perpetuate an unjust social system” (58). As an example, he writes that “buying slaves to set them free lends legitimacy to a slave regime by suggesting that it is morally permissible to buy and sell human beings” (58). Nevertheless, buying and freeing slaves—even if it inadvertently perpetuates slavery—is the right thing to do. I wonder why instead of buying Shelby would not advocate for helping slaves escape. Perhaps, this hints that Shelby does think the non-oppressed do have a higher level of obedience to the system required even when concerning matters directly related to the oppressed. More generally, I think Shelby would allow disobedience to some extent from the non-oppressed (or non-jewish in this case) in the name of the oppressed–however only concerning actions which directly benefit the oppressed. On the question at hand, Varden writes that in Nazi Germany there were no political obligations as a minimally just state did not exist (I wonder how Varden determines if a state is minimally just). This lack of political obligations seems to apply to both parties. I could see Varden and Shelby disagreeing on the extent obedience is morally required between the oppressed and non-oppressed in situations where there is not a minimally just state.
On an endnote, Varden acknowledges the manner in which Kant excluded minorities in his discussions on freedom. However, she writes that “Kant did not make this mistake at the level of abstract freedom theorizing.” I question if it is truly possible to create a system of freedom on the macro level that is truly inclusive while still actively excluding on the micro level.
Violet's Original Post: Some Clarifying Questions
ReplyDeleteVarden argues that, to improve Kant’s liberal republican theory, it is important to include his “‘moral anthropology’ (human nature) and ‘the principle of politics’ (historical societies),” as well as to “relinquish[]” the “binary distinction between the state of nature and civil society,” and finally to recognize “the four legal-political conditions as forces present in historical societies together” (17). These four (distinct?) requirements “add to the development of the liberal republican approach” and “help us see that…there can exist pockets of reality that may be devoid of justice or that are channeling injustice despite the fact that we live within the liberal-political framework of a republic” (17). To clarify, do the second two follow from the first two? Does adding moral anthropology allow one to relinquish the binary, and does adding a principle of politics allow us to acknowledge pockets of injustice within a republican framework? Or are these four requirements distinct from one another?
Varden argues that in situations where a republic has sexist prosperity laws, homophobic sodomy laws, or racist marriage laws, it is “unsatisfying” to conclude that either these states fulfill “minimally just” requirements, making such injustices “unimportant,” or that they “undermine the entire public legal-political framework” (18). She seems to think that in such situations of republics which are just in some respects but unjust in others, it is unsatisfying to deem them satisfactorily just and deny the importance of such injustices, or to say that these states are unjust and imply no political obligations upon its members.
Varden proceeds by explaining that developing Kant’s principle of politics to break down the binary distinction between “the state of nature and civil society” (18) could help solve this problem. By viewing such situations as “pockets” of either barbaric, despotic, or anarchic injustice within “otherwise just societies,” we can “speak to these issues in more complex ways” (18). It seems like this project is obviously helpful towards accurately characterizing political responsibilities in generally just republics with pockets of injustice. Describing states in this way would explain why it is important for us to generally obey the laws of, for example, the United States, despite serious existing injustices (we still need to avoid killing each other or pay taxes to build roads).
What I don’t understand is how using Kant’s “moral anthropology” is tied to this purpose.
She argues that while early liberal republican theories can capture well why “slavery is always wrong…, why bodily wrongs are particularly serious…, and why being forced to engage in sexual trade is a systemic failure of justice,” they cannot explain “sexual assault’s heinousness; our bodies’ importance to our social identities; the patterns of sexual and gendered violence involving or combining racism, sexism , or heterosexism; the temptation and power of sexual violence to unground us emotionally; or how sexual violence can be used for destructive political forces” (17). What is the importance of explaining these phenomena in a liberal republican theory? What is required of a minimally just state towards mitigating acts of sexual violence or racist acts – is it enough for them to be illegal, or must they not happen at all?
I guess my confusions flow from a fundamental misunderstanding of Varden’s central aim.
Hey Bika! I really enjoyed your connection between Varden’s spectrum model and Shelby’s reciprocity argument, especially in how you explore obedience in unjust systems. I think Shelby’s accountability framework might help to address your question about whether the level of obedience morally required differs between Jewish and non-Jewish residents in Nazi Germany.
ReplyDeleteI think you did a great job of summarizing Varden’s stance that because Nazi Germany was not a minimally just state, everyone is absolved of any kind of political obligations (she defines a minimally just state as one whose “basic principles…[are] those of justice as freedom” (9)). For Varden, this means neither Jewish nor non-Jewish residents owe obedience to the regime. However, Shelby complicates this picture by introducing natural duties, particularly the duty of justice, which persist even in deeply unjust contexts (DG 57). These duties create moral obligations that are not tied to the legitimacy of the state but instead to the importance of resisting oppression.
Applying Shelby’s framework, I think he would argue that the level of obedience morally required differs between Jewish and non-Jewish residents in large parts according to their social positions within the oppressive system. For Jewish residents, who are directly targeted by the regime, Shelby would likely see little to no obligation to obey laws that perpetuate their oppression (DG p. 75, 79, specifically his comments about black martyrdom, etc.). In fact, he argues their moral agency might manifest primarily through acts of self-preservation or quiet resistance (p. 61 and self-segregation as one example). Thus, their primary duty would be to themselves and their community rather than to the state.
Regarding non-Jewish residents, I think Shelby’s framework imposes a greater responsibility. While they may also have similarly reduced obligations to obey unjust laws, their privileged position within the system gives them access to resources and opportunities that could be leveraged to resist oppression. Shelby’s slave-market example illustrates this dynamic: buying slaves to free them might inadvertently legitimize slavery (DG 58), but he still considers it a moral duty because it reduces immediate harm. Similarly, non-Jewish residents in Nazi Germany might be morally obligated to disobey laws that harm Jews like even if actions risk complicity with the regime. For Shelby, harm reduction takes precedence in these extreme cases of systemic injustice. This distinction aligns with Shelby’s broader principle of reciprocity as those who benefit from social cooperation (or from relative privilege within the system) owe a greater duty to push back against injustice than those who are oppressed by it. In this sense, non-Jewish citizens’ moral obligations would extend as they would be accountable for actively resisting oppression using means available only to them.
I also really like your point about Kant’s “macro freedom vs. micro exclusion”. Again, Shelby’s accountability model would be helpful in filling the gap for Varden and Kant here: when institutions fail (basically macro exclusion), natural duties demand individual level moral action. For example, oppressed groups might practice quiet resistance while the non-oppressed leverage privilege to disrupt oppression. In that way, individuals could compensate for institutional failures through duty-driven agency.
All in all, I think Varden and Shelby aren’t at odds, but rather meld well together. While Varden’s account examines whether obedience is owed, Shelby offers an account of how moral duties manifest when it isn’t.