Questions from Discussion With Prof. Varden

I have some half-baked, lingering questions from our discussion with Prof. Varden and would love to hear what you guys think (or if you have your own questions). Prof. Hurley, if we gather enough questions, maybe we could reach out to her for a follow-up if she's open to it?

On Omnilateral Will: I might be wrong that omnilateral will is a tool of legitimacy within the framework, but we discussed quite a bit on how omnilateral will is so deeply polluted by isms and such. Given that, I’m struggling to understand why we are still so drawn to it. If it’s not epistemically viable / instrumentally productive (no matter how accurate it may be according to Kant's definition of "will"), how legitimating can it be?

On Moral Agency: Prof. Varden noted that some situations have no morally viable choices to pick from. I can’t really think of an example in real life where that’s the case. Isn’t there always a lesser evil to choose from? Isn’t this where moral agency should step in to prevent what she deems to be “formal wrongs”?

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