I still don't get how to think about personal agency.
Ripstein's Kantian argument is developed through considering the protection of everyone's freedom as the basis for rights. I have long been confused about how to think about freedom and liberty, but since it is so important to Ripstein's account it feels less chicken-shitty than usual to discuss here. I generally think about the world in a deterministic framework. Not in that some divine being decided what will happen, but more so in the sense that things have been set in motion that can not be undone based on the laws of physics. Since we are just atoms bouncing around, there is only one possible future, and as such, there is technically no free will. We choose to consider ourselves as having free will such that we can hold each other accountable and enjoy a feeling of personal agency in our lives, but this is taken aside from the reality that we ultimately have no control over what we do. And while this generally fits with how we think about the world, it makes it difficult to think about independent action as a normative basis for right and wrong. According to the Universal Principle of Right "an action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law," where "freedom is independence from being constrained by another's choice" (Ripstein 13). But how could you ever not be constrained by other people's choices? Even assuming there is some quantum decision making in the brain that is true free will, I'm still confused about what Kantian independence looks like. It seems Kant prioritizes the "capacity to set purposes without having them set by others" but if my decision on setting purposes is always determined by interactions with the environment, and other people are in any way part of the environment, how can they ever not alter my capacity to set purposes? I may be making a similar critique as the one that is responded to in chapter 2 (that is "freedom cannot even be articulated as a political value, because freedoms always come into conflict, and the only way to mediate those conflicts is by appealing to goods other than freedom"), but I just don't get the intuition on what freedom is in this context. Generally, I don't see much use in talking about determinism because it doesn't change the way we value things, yet that also means I don't think we can use our individual and arbitrary conceptions of free will as a substantial basis for a normative theory. It has to in some way smuggle in ideals which, even if they are intuitive need philosophical grounding for consistency nonetheless.
I fear there is a one sentence answer to this question that I just don't see, but I was sufficiently distracted by this point while reading that it was hard to think of much else.
Have a great night,
Aidan
Hi Aidan! I’ve never thought to view Ripstein through a deterministic framework! I imagine that if Ripstein were to try to merge his beliefs within a deterministic framework he might then put freedom on a scale and argue that some actions are more apparently free than others (i.e. me putting a gun to your head and forcing you to run around in circles versus you running around in circles without me putting a gun to your head).
ReplyDeleteOn your point about being constrained by others choices, I do not think Ripstein would think that any constraints on your choices is a violation of your freedom. Instead, I think Ripstein takes issue with constraints that limit “your ability to use your powers to set and pursue your own purposes” (16). It’s okay for others to “change the world in ways that make your means useless” (16). To demonstrate this, Ripstein writes about someone taking the last carton of milk you wanted to buy–this is not a violation of your freedom, simply a world in which you are unable to meet your purpose. Similarly, if I open a competing business that ‘steals’ your customers, I am not violating your freedom.
On another note, I thought Ripstein’s discussion about how it is possible to harm another without wronging them was interesting. The examples that best clarified what he meant was: “if I touch you without your consent while you sleep, or use your property without your consent while you are absent, I draw you into my purposes and wrong you” even if there is no identifiable harm (22). This discussion reminded me about data privacy. If a company harvests my data without my consent, I do not have an identifiable harm but I could make the case that you have wronged me. A company could ‘draw’ me into their purposes by then feeding my targeted ads to convince me to buy something or vote for someone.
Violet's Original Post: What really is private property?
ReplyDeleteI'm wondering to what extent clear definitions of property rights may need to be defined in an account like Ripstein's.
Does one not own the right to have light on your land, per his lighthouse example (244)? This made me think that there are surely different specifications in different locations and examples as to what you have a property right in, and this is necessary to carving out conditions of interaction which ensures freedom while protecting property rights.
I also wonder if common assumptions of what is included in property rights changes over time, particularly as the relevant uses of property change? He says that "Modern legal systems take the basic case of property in land to include the heavens above and the earth below, down to the center of the Earth" (251). But right now, don't airplanes regularly fly over private land, like suburban neighborhoods by airports? Is it only not a problem now because people typically don't have a use for the sky above their home? What if, in 100 years (or less?), flying cars (personal airplanes?) are much more common and commercial airplanes become a restriction on your ability to fly or park in your sky-driveway? Or for your kids to play in the sky-backyard on their flying broomsticks?
Probably in this example, the preconditions of private right would necessitate a public sky road and sky traffic rules. But what I am trying to highlight is how relevant inclusions of what it means to have a property right in something must require specific definitions.
Bika also pointedly informed me that some small planes still have lead in their gas, which causes air pollution. Communities closer to airports particularly suffer, like finding lead in the blood of residents. While this seems like a clear violation of property rights (surely you have a property right in yourself and a right to not be dangerously exposed in your own home), it further illuminates practical examples of property rights clashing. If we want airplanes to be able to fly, but doing so clashes with private rights, how do we create the public infrastructure that allows for both?
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-determines-lead-emissions-aircraft-engines-cause-or-contribute-air-pollution