Girlpower: Let's Break the Law!
I want to explore the implications of Shelby’s argument in Chapter 8, where he asserts that “the victims of social injustice, having been denied their fair share of the benefits of social cooperation, have a reduced obligation to obey the law” (235). Shelby grounds this claim in the principle of reciprocity, by discussing that when a society fails to uphold justice, those burdened by systemic injustices are not bound to uphold its legal framework in the same way that those who are not are. Importantly, Shelby maintains that a state in an unjust society still has the right to penalize actions that are wrongs in themselves (mala in se) since it would be justifiably needed to protect innocent civilians.
While Shelby’s account is discussed in the context of the ghetto poor, he does acknowledge in the introduction that he’s also concerned with gender and class (although not the specific topic of discussion in this book) since they are all interconnected. As a result, I think it’s interesting to examine how, under Shelby’s account, structural sexism can release women from certain legal obligations under the same grounds. In our crossover event tutorial, Professor Hurley shared a case where a police officer advised his daughter to treat stop lights as stop signs after 11 p.m. because it was unsafe for a young woman to linger at certain intersections at night. Unlike men, who are not subject to structural sexism, women face unique dangers that may justify disregarding prescribed traffic laws in certain situations. In this case, structural sexism reduces young women's obligation to strictly follow traffic laws when their safety is at risk.
While we have been examining the obligation to obey the law for different disadvantaged groups independent of one another, what happens when we consider how these disadvantaged groups (i.e ghetto poor, women, etc.) operate together in society. How does the state or legal system logistically manage a society where legal obligations—and the ability to penalize —are applied unevenly due to systemic injustices? What criteria determine the degree to which a group is justified in disengaging from legal compliance and what aspects of the law they have reduced obligations to obey? Who has the authority to make such determinations? What happens when an individual is part of multiple disadvantaged groups (i.e is a woman and part of the ghetto poor): do or should their lesser obligations to upholding different aspects of the law depending on the type of injustice faced compound?
Now, on a completely unrelated note, are individuals who have never been part of the ghetto poor justified in committing crimes on their behalf? For instance, is it permissible for someone to engage in tax evasion with the explicit purpose of redistributing those funds to the ghetto poor even if they themselves are not a member of this group?
Hi Sophia,
ReplyDeleteI loved reading your blog post, as I had also underlined this part of Chapter 8 and wanted to discuss it further. I’ll try to answer some of your questions in this response (as I think Shelby would respond) and I will also bring up a recent case that this made me think of.
First, when legal obligations are applied unevenly due to systemic injustices, it is because the state has failed to uphold the principle of reciprocity. The degree to which a group is justified in disengaging from legal compliance depends on whether the law in question reinforces oppression rather than justice. As I see it, the ‘criteria’ that determine how much a group is justified in practicing legal obedience, is the amount of burdens they are shouldering unfairly due to the state’s ignorance towards the principle of reciprocity. As you point out, Shelby draws a key distinction between mala in se offenses, which should still be penalized, and other offenses, which can be morally resisted if they uphold structural inequalities (like the daughter running a red light for her own safety in your example. The challenge here is that the legal system does not formally recognize these distinctions, making enforcement inconsistent and often unjust. A solution to this issue could be similar to Chamallas’ view that legal reform/progress is possible when harmful legal ideologies are identified and reformed, like in the Catholic Church case that “challenged restrictive statutes of limitations rules that typically required tort victims to file suit within two or three years from the date of the abuse”. To quote your own essay “While not a complete solution, this progress serves as an indicator that inequality can be addressed, lessened, and potentially abolished through intervention”. (Lakhani 5)
Regarding your question about individuals who belong to multiple disadvantaged groups, such as women who are also part of the ghetto poor, I think Shelby would return to his broader argument. It suggests that the more systemic injustices one faces, the weaker their moral obligation to obey laws that fail to protect them, meaning that someone who experiences both racial and gender-based oppression might have an even stronger claim to resist certain legal constraints. That being said, Shelby warns against viewing lawbreaking as a comprehensive solution to systemic injustice, emphasizing instead that the focus should be on structural reforms rather than individual acts of noncompliance (239). While someone from a privileged background might feel morally compelled to commit crimes such as tax evasion to redistribute wealth, I think Shelby would argue that this is not a legitimate or effective response. Instead, he would advocate for systemic changes addressing the root causes of economic injustice rather than acts of vigilante, robinhood-esque justice that could undermine broader political efforts.
Lastly, your post also made me think about Trump’s recent tweet threatening to cut federal funding for universities that allow “illegal protests” and to imprison or deport protestors. This is an unconstitutional overreach—public universities have a legal obligation to uphold the First Amendment, which protects students' right to protest. Shelby’s argument helps explain why this type of authoritarian response is especially concerning: when the state punishes groups unfairly for expressing dissent, it reinforces the very injustices that weaken people’s obligation to obey the law. By criminalizing protest and attempting to silence political opposition, Trump’s statement exemplifies how unjust governance can erode the legitimacy of legal authority, potentially justifying acts of resistance under Shelby’s framework. I am interested to see the response of student groups across the country.
- Eliot