blogger wants me silenced 😒 anyways, this is my response comment to sophia (and sort of aidan)

 (This is a response to Sophia's blog post, but Blogger told me my comment was "too long" whatever that means...)

Hey Sophia!! I wanted to post about this topic as well, so my comment will initially just build on your observations. However, I also want to raise a few points about this account that trouble me (which are semi-related to Aidan’s blog post). To preface, I am NOT a libertarian by any means, nor am I a huge Nozick fan: these comments are not at all meant to claim that libertarianism provides a better framework. However, I want to push further on the libertarian-Ripstein tension because I am confused on why we pick and choose what counts as constraints on individual action and, more importantly, what the implications of this are on state coercive action. 

Some preliminary thoughts: 

First, as you identify, true individual freedom for Kant is not just about autonomy. Libertarians would assert that individual autonomy = individual freedom, justifying minimal intervention except when someone violates another's autonomy or rights (for example, when someone infringes upon someone else’s property, the state should step in). However, as Ripstein establishes from the outset of his text, Kantian independence is not the same as autonomy. He gives a good example to make this point: a slave may be autonomous in the sense that they can make decisions for themselves if permitted, but they are not independent because they remain subject to the benevolence (or lack thereof) of their master.

Second, the requirement of independence from the will of others, which is central to individual freedom, has a few caveats, notably regarding state intervention and punishment.

Ripstein writes on page 27: “Whenever someone acts in a way that is contrary to right, others are entitled to constrain the wrongdoer’s conduct. Such constraint is not an interference with freedom; it is the hindering of a hindrance to freedom.” He goes on to explain that, “punishment upholds the supremacy of law by upholding the state’s entitlement to direct conduct, both prospectively and retrospectively.” This implies that the state has more than just the right to influence individual actions; it has a responsibility, through punishment and through establishing the public conditions necessary for freedom.

This is where my concern arises. Clearly, freedom cannot be defined as pure independence from the will and choices of others, because if intervention is necessary to establish conditions that are conducive to free action, then the process of getting to that point will inevitably coerce and constrain the choices individuals can make.

So, why do we consider state intervention as a propagator of individual freedom (despite it often influencing, constraining, and dictating individual action) while still maintaining it within the Kantian ideal of freedom as independence from the will of others?

The easy answer is arbitrariness, and this definitely explains a lot of it! Intervention and punishment are completely justifiable (e.g., the "hindering of a hindrance to freedom" argument is compelling, and one that Nozick would likely agree with). The argument for taxes and subsidies can also be easily justified, even from a wealth-maximizing perspective. So, these ‘constraints on freedom’ are intrinsically different from the arbitrary will of other individuals.

But I worry about this account because it affords the state coercive legitimacy as long as it can offer a justification similar to the "hindering of a hindrance to freedom" argument. And, as Aidan points out in his blog post, all action is, to some degree, influenced by others. Personal agency will never be absolute unless one exists in a vacuum (which introduces a whole other set of mind-bending questions about personhood, agency, etc., but we won’t go into that here). Therefore, the ability to justify coercive action by the state will always exist. At what point, then, do we start to see state coercion as arbitrary, and therefore an incursion on freedom? I doubt that even the 13 of us could come to a definitive conclusion on that, much less an entire country. More importantly, how may we prevent exploitation by the state of such justifications to attain other ends? 

Shelby’s forced integration example fits in well here; is coercive action in the form of residential integration and neighborhood restructuring legitimate because the state is entitled to support those who cannot support themselves, and establishes conditions under which the black, urban poor have greater freedom? Certainly, under Ripstein’s account! But I think it would be deeply problematic to give the state legitimate authority over one’s freedom of association just because an argument can be made that such constraints hinder other hindrances to freedom.

Curious to know what you think!