Shout out Bob Dylan, shout out Wilt Chamberlain

I will, unfortunately, not be writing about Bob Dylan or Wilt Chamberlain. I apologize if my title misled you. Instead, I wanted to shed light on the role that the Hobbesian state of nature plays within Ripstein's account of corrective justice, and ultimately his "fault standard." 

Ripstein uses Hobbes' account to build "a world without any idea of enforceable responsibility" (24). This starting point is essential as it creates the necessity for a framework that governs human relations, which would otherwise be characterized by chaos. Within Hobbes' state of nature, I have no responsibility over the injuries that I would cause you, in fact your injuries should be pursued by me if they further my own benefit. Ripstein writes that within this state of nature or, as he describes it, "pure agency," there is "no room for ideas of concern or respect for others, let alone for even the thinnest idea of community or of a common fate" (26). 

I, for one, am completely opposed to the idea that all humans are inherently devoid of any concern for others. Ripstein himself seems to discount aspects of Hobbes' state of nature as he points to some of its problems throughout the reading. I guess my question is if he recognized the limitations of this fundamental assumption that is being made, why did he choose it as the foundation for his theory on how we should administer justice when wrong has been done? 

Take the "standard of care" that he puts forth when outlining the fault system that he believes should inform torts. Because, within the Hobbesian state of nature, humans are inherently self-interested/aggrandizing, the standard of care has to make clear that "people moderate their activities in light of the interests of others" (51). But, what if people are already inherently conscious of the impact that their actions have on others?

I could be reading into this too much (or straight up reading it wrong), but since he is making an argument about the way we should relate to the literal law, I find it peculiar that he would make this insinuation that humans are predisposed to not caring for others based on a theory of human nature that  is--dare I say--uncorroborated. To me, it just reinforces the idea that humans are individualistic and selfish which, I would argue, leads to the justification of all sorts of terrible things that happen in the world. 


Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 13, 2025 at 9:34 AM

    One way to look at his argument is that he wants to show, starting with the striking inadequacies of Hobbes, how different accounts can be seen as attempts to respond to this inadequacy, e.g. voluntarists and libertarian causalists, and why their responses are inadequate. I wonder if his point can be understood as aligning with yours -- that unless we see an account of rightful and wrongful interaction as presupposing fair terms of interaction (your concern for others), we cannot produce an adequate account?

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