Not a pessimist but not an idealist ( + Nozick just for fun)
I want to put Nozick and Rawls in conversation with each other because I think that at a high level they both are specifying the background conditions that must be satisfied for a distribution to be just. For Nozick, he relies on the Lockean proviso (i.e someone’s appropriation of property can be considered just so long as there is enough and as good left for everyone else) which provides the foundation for his subsequent entitlement theory within which justice in acquisition, transfer and the rectification of justice in holdings are principles. For Rawls, the background conditions that must be satisfied for distribution to be just are the two principles that he asserts would be consented to in the original position—which imagines individuals behind a veil of ignorance, where they do not know their social status, talents, or personal biases. The first principle specifies that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties” and the difference principle which states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls 53).
In asserting what basic liberties should be granted under the first principle, Rawls notes “political liberty” and “the right to hold personal property” as some such liberties. However, he specifies that other liberties such as “the right to own certain kinds of property (i.e means of production)” are not protected by the first principle because they are not basic liberties. Rather than explain the distinction, Rawls takes this to be self-evident—something I find to be a shortcoming in his analysis. What defines a basic liberty? Also, I could see Nozick challenging Rawls’ distinction between personal property and the means of production by questioning the arbitrary line drawn between them. If individuals have a right to personal property, why should that right be restricted when it extends to productive resources? Nozick would argue that such a distinction is an artificial imposition that violates the principles of self-ownership and voluntary exchange. For Nozick, individuals should be free to use their legitimately acquired resources as they see fit, including for economic enterprise. Without answering these questions, I find Rawls’ explanation of the liberties secured under the first principle unsatisfactory.
My last thought relates to the idea that Rawls’ theory is an idealist one (and perhaps this is a broader critique of idealist theories in general), is that it is so abstract and removed from real-life conditions that it may fail to provide meaningful substantive analysis for actual policy-making or societal structuring. Rawls constructs his framework behind the veil of ignorance, where individuals in the original position make decisions without knowledge of their social status, abilities, or personal circumstances. While this setup is useful for conceptualizing fairness in a hypothetical sense (which he intends it to do), it does not grapple with the complexities of real-world inequalities, historical injustices, or the practical mechanisms required to implement his principles. I struggle to reconcile how such a theory is applied into the world today that clearly operates under non-ideal conditions… perhaps Shelby will shed some light on this (?)
Violet's Original Post: Ideal Theory and Epistemic Positioning?
ReplyDeleteI wonder if there is a fundamental problem with formulating a theory of justice from behind a veil of ignorance based on epistemic advantage and disadvantage.
To form principles from behind a veil of ignorance entails that “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” (11). This “ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances” because “no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition” (11).
I would imagine that this would also ensure a viable principle of justice because people would not form principles that would disadvantage those who are not naturally advantaged by chance or social status. However, wouldn’t this require that people had a fairly comprehensive understanding of the different ways one can be disadvantaged? If people were generally unaware of a way one can be disadvantaged, is it possible that the principle of justice they choose would not ensure that those people are protected?
We think we have a comprehensive sense of justice (and ways to be disadvantaged) today, but this has required a long historical process of people fighting to not be disadvantaged in ways that were accepted by the rest of society. What types of disadvantages will we see as critical to justice in the future?
If so, is this just a general fault of an ideal theory? Does a comprehensive consideration of marginally situated people require non-ideal theory?
A lot of overlap between the end of Sophia's post and the beginning of Violet's. Does Rawls abstract away from crucial knowledge, in his original position behind the veil of ignorance, that we need to craft effective fundamental principles of justice? Rawls' answer is that it does not, but that it does abstract away from crucial knowledge that we would need to apply these basic principles within any given society. To do that, the veil of ignorance must be lifted, so that the circumstances of our history can be taken into account. Does this address your worry? Why or why not?
ReplyDeleteOn Sophia's earlier worry about which are the basic liberties, and why personal property is among the basic liberties, but private property in the means of production is not, don't we treat what can be private property (not national parks, or amtrack, or most schools, or most prisons, or...) as something that is not a question of fundamental right, but a question to be resolved through legislative processes. We can create legal rights to privately control such things, e.g. we can privatize Amtrack or the Post Office, but there is no basic liberty at stake. Behind the veil of ignorance there will be certain things we will recognize that we want to secure a basic liberties, e.g. freedom of movement, association, and religion, and certain things that we will distribute as necessary to secure fair opportunity and the difference principle, e.g. private property. The answer to Sophia's challenge, then, is provided, on Rawls' view, by the nature of the principles of justice we will choose from a position that is fair, the original position. What do you think?