Prisoner's Dilemma and Authority

    In the Prisoner's Dilemma, we are presented with a hypothetical which explains that without systems of trust, or an authority to enforce cooperation, rational individuals are incentivized to act in their own self-interest, even if it leads to a worse outcome for everyone. In Hobbes's Leviathan, the State of Nature becomes a State of War, where at the risk of being attacked by someone else, no one lowers their weapons.  I believe that Hobbes’s solution to this chaos aligns with the core idea of resolving the dilemma: an authority (the sovereign) can enforce cooperation by imposing consequences, ensuring that individuals act to benefit the whole.

    There is also an overarching importance of authority in Locke's work. First, he establishes the State of Nature as conditional on lacking authority: "Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature"(15). Locke highlights that individuals cannot be impartial judges in matters involving themselves because personal bias would lead to overly harsh and self-serving decisions instead of pure retribution. So, a separate judge is needed. In contrast to Hobbes's declaring the State of War as a natural end, Locke looks at war as a lack of authority/judge: "permits me my own the defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to out common judge, nor the decision of the law"(15). 

    However, this provokes many more questions. Can law truly remain unbiased and universal in its application, or does it require a sovereign figure/judge to interpret it? Is there a clear separation between the two forms of authority, or do they overlap in creation?


- Mea

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Updated Syllabus

                                                                         SYLLABUS                         Courses: PPE Philosophy Seminar and Philosophy Tutorial Seminar Time: Thursday (and sometimes on Tuesday) 1:15-4:00 Seminar Place: Kravis 168 (when not online or outside) Tutorial Time: Designated Tuesdays, by appointment Professor: Paul Hurley Contact Info: paul.hurley@cmc.edu Office Hours: W 2:00-4:00, F 12:30-2:30 (with occasional rescheduling to accommodate faculty meetings)   INTRODUCTION This is t...
Read more

securing legitimate expectations - rawls (ft chamallas)

To what extent should legal precedent, founded on increasingly unpalatable institutional values, be upheld for the sake of formal justice? Rawls posits that justice must be grounded in the protection of legitimate expectations, particularly in a system where individuals have good reason to rely on established rules. Formal justice, according to Rawls, is the “impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive principles” (51). This is a powerful argument for stability and predictability in legal systems, where individuals can align their actions with the expectations of the law, knowing that even if they will be treated unjustly (as formal justice does not preclude unjust laws), they will be treated consistently . Individuals will at least “know what is demanded" so that they can "try to protect themselves accordingly; whereas there is even greater injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cas...
Read more

Anderson, Brettschneider, and Shiffrin: What a Trio.

​​Sorry if I jump in between ideas a bit too quickly. Just trying to get it all figured out in my head! Shiffrin x Brettschneider: Shiffrin states early on that constitutional content does not track justiciability (993). But if constitutional content does not track justiciability (aka certain constitutional violations like government officials lying / violating the First Amendment are acknowledged to exist but are nevertheless nonjusticiable), I'm still left confused on what the normative OR institutional point of having a Supreme Court is? Isn’t the foundational idea of judicial review that the Court exists precisely to interpret and enforce constitutional limits, particularly against executive or legislative overreach? If constitutional provisions or principles are beyond the Court’s reach and enforcement lies elsewhere, where lies its core role? Shiffrin seems to suggest that the Supreme Court still has a role in clarifying and promoting constitutional ideals even when it can’t ...
Read more