Jan 22: Hobbes and the contract



Within the Hobbesian framework, the natural condition of man is one of "war." This state of contention is manifested from the inherent equality of man. Given this equality, superiority between individuals becomes marginal, and as Hobbes characterizes human nature by an avarice wherein "if any two men desire the same thing... they become enemies," we are left with a natural state of violence and competition. (Paradoxically) Within this violence, man searches for peace out of fear for his individual life (The first of nineteen fundamental natural laws that Hobbes outlines). The pursuit of this peace is not rooted in the maintenance of a "state of freedom" that Locke, for example, outlines, but rather it is purely from a place of self-preservation. The commonwealth is positioned in such to provides us with the required contract to assure this self-preservation. We don't seek its establishment toward the end of some common good. The commonwealth, and the accompanied "terror" it instills in its subjects, provides the guarantee of collective safety that Hobbes's self-centered view of human nature requires. Violation of such a contract would be antithetical to our own interests as it would compromise our ability to selfishly move through the world without clashing with others doing the same. 

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Updated Syllabus

                                                                         SYLLABUS                         Courses: PPE Philosophy Seminar and Philosophy Tutorial Seminar Time: Thursday (and sometimes on Tuesday) 1:15-4:00 Seminar Place: Kravis 168 (when not online or outside) Tutorial Time: Designated Tuesdays, by appointment Professor: Paul Hurley Contact Info: paul.hurley@cmc.edu Office Hours: W 2:00-4:00, F 12:30-2:30 (with occasional rescheduling to accommodate faculty meetings)   INTRODUCTION This is t...
Read more

securing legitimate expectations - rawls (ft chamallas)

To what extent should legal precedent, founded on increasingly unpalatable institutional values, be upheld for the sake of formal justice? Rawls posits that justice must be grounded in the protection of legitimate expectations, particularly in a system where individuals have good reason to rely on established rules. Formal justice, according to Rawls, is the “impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive principles” (51). This is a powerful argument for stability and predictability in legal systems, where individuals can align their actions with the expectations of the law, knowing that even if they will be treated unjustly (as formal justice does not preclude unjust laws), they will be treated consistently . Individuals will at least “know what is demanded" so that they can "try to protect themselves accordingly; whereas there is even greater injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cas...
Read more

Anderson, Brettschneider, and Shiffrin: What a Trio.

​​Sorry if I jump in between ideas a bit too quickly. Just trying to get it all figured out in my head! Shiffrin x Brettschneider: Shiffrin states early on that constitutional content does not track justiciability (993). But if constitutional content does not track justiciability (aka certain constitutional violations like government officials lying / violating the First Amendment are acknowledged to exist but are nevertheless nonjusticiable), I'm still left confused on what the normative OR institutional point of having a Supreme Court is? Isn’t the foundational idea of judicial review that the Court exists precisely to interpret and enforce constitutional limits, particularly against executive or legislative overreach? If constitutional provisions or principles are beyond the Court’s reach and enforcement lies elsewhere, where lies its core role? Shiffrin seems to suggest that the Supreme Court still has a role in clarifying and promoting constitutional ideals even when it can’t ...
Read more