Hobbes' State of Nature as a Prisoner's Dilemma, and Notions of Right and Wrong

Hobbes and Locke both discuss the inherent equality and freedom of people in the State of Nature to act as they want (within the bounds of the laws of nature they provide). However, I was immediately struck by their contrasting views on how people in the SoN reason. I view the Hobbesian SoN (before the introduction of a sovereign) as a prisoner’s dilemma due to the “three principal causes of quarrel” he describes, which provide different outcomes/benefits for people. 

These are competition, diffidence, and glory, which all stem from his outcome-centered account of reason where he argues that the natural equality of man leads to forming enemies in the pursuit of self-preservation. In competition and, separately, in the pursuit of glory, one man is often killed by another, an outcome less optimal than a murderless state in which all men achieve their ends of self-preservation. Because Hobbes argues that these quarrels are inherent to the SoN, but cooperation between people in such a state would help them all survive, it is very much a prisoner’s dilemma.

Because Hobbes believes the SoN is a SoW, he states that no injustice or concept of right or wrong exists. Because there is no common power, and therefore no law, he argues that the notion of injustice cannot exist. I find it interesting that he believes some men will kill others for personal glory (for “a smile … or by reflection in their kindred” 78)  in an equal state, while others will focus only on surviving. 

While I understand how he believes notions of right and wrong cannot exist without law, it raises the question of how men who achieve glory might create a hierarchy in which the notions of injustice are created. I think that those who start quarrels from glory and kill for reputation will be seen as an enemy whose ends cause a “reflection in their kindred” that is similar to a notion of wrongness, though it may not be defined, it will still be felt by man. I am curious to discuss this in class.

- Eliot

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