Hobbes, Locke, Equality, Religion, and the State of Nature

Both Hobbes and Locke view equality as a foundational aspect of their respective definitions of the state of nature. They also both acknowledge the role of religion within the state of nature. The extent to which they intertwine religion and equality helps me make more sense of how they reach different conclusions about the state of nature. 

    Hobbes views God as an enforcer of oaths but that's about it. When speaking about the incentive of going to heaven Hobbes says "There being but one way imaginable, and that is not breaking, but keeping covenant". He counters any argument that the influence of heaven is an additional incentive besides preserving one's life, by arguing that there is no natural knowledge of life after death, so heaven can't be a reasonable motivation. Similarly, religion doesn't play a role in his arguments about equality. They instead seem to be based on observation "Nature hath made men so equal...when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable". Because of this lack of religion, there is no golden rule of underlying motivations. So equality means equal ability and desires, and therefore competition, not cooperation.

On the other hand, Locke views the natural laws that encourage nature to be a state of peace as a version of the golden rule. If that rule is violated, the actor is outside the rule of reason and equity "which is the measure God has set to the actions of men". The state of liberty that is Locke's state of nature is formed by the idea that all men are god's creation and therefore "there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another". In the absence of a great enforcer, there is a religious reason for the state of nature to be a state of peace and cooperation. To me, this implies that there is always a great enforcer in Locke's view--God--though that's not explicit in the text. 

In summary, an oversimplification of Hobbes' and Locke's differences in the state of nature could be their belief in religion as our source of equality. 



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