Hobbes and the Foole

 In Hobbes’ Leviathan, Hobbes argues that in a state of nature, where there is no central authority, humans exist in a state of war and conflict. To escape the state of nature, individuals must consent to a social contract, or covenant, and a central authority must be established. The central authority is essential as it compels individuals to adhere to the contract since the “terror of some punishment” from such central power “is greater than the benefit” expected by breaching the covenant (89).  

The Fool argues that since humans are inherently self-interested and responsible for their own survival, it can be rational for individuals to break the covenant if doing so better serves their individual interests. For example, breaking the agreement, or injustice, can align with reason if it allows an individual to ignore the criticisms or power of others. If the covenant is broken, the state of nature and state of war will persist. 

As part of his response to the Fool, Hobbes argues that actions that foreseeably lead to an individual’s “own destruction” (91) are irrational even if some actions may unexpectedly have favorable outcomes. In this sense, Hobbes argues that it would be irrational for an individual to break a covenant as doing so would likely result in negative consequences in the long run. In turn, this contradicts the law of nature which prioritizes self-preservation. When asserting this counterargument, Hobbes assumes that individuals can predict the consequences of their actions and always accurately gauge risk. However, I find this assumption to be somewhat flawed as individuals often act on incomplete information or immediate needs, which affect their ability to have accurate foresight. For example, if an individual is in a high-pressure, time-constrained circumstance (i.e in immediate danger or oppression), breaking a covenant may appear rational despite the long-term risks. In such a situation, the direness of the circumstance may even cloud the individual’s ability to consider and assess the risks of breaking the covenant. 

In another section of his response, Hobbes notes that breaking a covenant is irrational since “no man can hope by his own strength or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of Confederates” (91). If an individual breaks a covenant, they signal to others that they are untrustworthy which impedes their ability to form the alliances needed to avoid destruction. Moreover, Hobbes notes that such injustice prevents an individual from being accepted into a unified society since they will inevitably be excluded and left to struggle independently once others recognize their true character. This argument rests on the assumption that all alliances are solely built on trust. In this, I find Hobbes oversimplifies the factors involved in human cooperation. Is trust always a necessary or sufficient condition for alliances to succeed? In some cases, can other factors—such as access to resources or mutual threats—make alliances viable and attractive, even in the absence of trust? Furthermore, Hobbes’ claim that a covenant-breaker will inevitably be outcast by others who recognize their actions fails to consider the human capacity for forgiveness and/or reconciliation. We often see that people tolerate or reintegrate those who have previously broken trust, especially if doing so serves a broader goal or the individual conveys remorse or a willingness to change. This makes me curious: to what extent does Hobbes believe in the ability of individuals to redeem themselves or exhibit self-growth with respect to honesty and loyalty?